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IN THE 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
October Term, 1918. 
F. L. BYRON and 
CHARLES S. AUSTIN, 
Respondents, 
vs. 
UTAH COPPER COMPANY, 
A CORPORATION, 
Appellant, 
and 
JOHN KNUDSON and 
GEORGE C. EARL, 
and 
Defendants, 
STEPHEN HAYS, Impleaded as 
an additional defendant, 
Respondent. 
No. 3240 
Appeal from Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, Han. George F. 
Trans. 
Page 
Goodwin, Judge. 
ABSTRACT OF RECORD 
[TITLE OF COURT AND CAUSE.] 
COMPLAINT. 
1 Filed March 31, 1916. 
Plaintiffs complain of the defendants, and for 
cause of action allege : 
2: 
1. That the defendant Utah Copper Com-
pany is now and at all of the times hereinafter 
mentioned was a corporation organized and exist-
ing under and by virtue of the laws of the State 
of New Jersey. 
2. That the plaintiffs are now and at all of 
the times hereinafter mentioned were the owners, 
in the possession and entitled to the possession 
and have the right to all ores in and underneath 
the surface therein, in the property hereinafter 
described, together with the right to mine and 
remove the same. 
3. That during the month of February, A. D. 
1916, the defendants unlawfully and wrongfully 
and without the consent of the plaintiffs, and 
without any right whatever, forcibly entered upon 
said premises hereinafter described, the property 
of the said plaintiffs, and did tear, break down, 
destroy, and remove certain chutes and other prop-
erty which the plaintiffs had constructed upon 
said premises for the purpose of removing said 
ore aforesaid, and then and there ordered plain-
tiffs to desist from removing any ore from said 
premises, and then and there stated and threatened 
that they, the said defendants, would forcibly 
eject and remove the plaintiffs, their agents, serv-
2 ants, and employees from said premises, if the 
plaintiffs, or either of them, attempted to remove 
or extract any ore from said premises, and then 
3 
and there stated and threatened that they would 
prevent the plaintiffs from placing or erecting any 
chutes or anything else on said premises for the 
purpose of removing said ore, and that they would 
continue to eject and remove the plaintiffs if they 
went upon said premises for the purpose of remov-
ing or extracting ore, and if necessary would ren-
der bodily harm to the plaintiffs, and to each of 
them; and plaintiffs fear that the said defendants 
will carry out said threats, unless restrained by 
a judgment and order of this court, and that if 
the defendants continue to harass and annoy the 
plaintiffs, and destroy plaintiffs' property, and 
prevent plaintiffs from removing said ore, they, 
the said defendants will put plaintiffs to irrepar-
able injury, and will put plaintiffs to the neces-
sity of bringing a multiplicity of actions to pro-
tect their said rights. 
4. Plaintiffs further allege that they have no 
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law; that 
said premises heretofore referred to are more 
particularly described as follows: 
Beginning at the S. W. corner of the west half 
of the east half of the N. W. quarter of Section 26, 
T. 3 S., Range 3 W., S. L. B. and M., thence S. 89 
degrees 55 min. E. 244 feet, thence in 5 degrees E. 
306 feet, thence N. 63 degrees 26 min. W., 59 feet, 
thence N. 23 degrees 7 min. E. 7 49, thence S. 
63 degrees 26 min. E. 21.5 feet, thence N. 29 degrees 
45 min. E. 162.5 feet, thence N. 2 degrees 45 min. 
W. 70 feet, thence N. 43 degrees 15 min. W. 55 feet, 
thence S. 57 degrees 39 min. 57.5 feet, thence N. 
49 degrees 15 min. W. 40 feet, more or less to the 
easterly corner of Lot 59, Smith Survey, of the 
town of Bingham on Valentine Scrip Entry, thence 
S. 41 degrees 48 min. W. along the southerly side 
line of Lots 59, 60 and 61 of said Smith Survey, 
170 feet more or less to easterly corner of Lots 62 
of said Smith Survey, thence S. 27 degrees 55 min. 
W. along the southerly side line of said Lots 52 and 
94 feet to the corner of Lot 63, Smith Survey, 
thence S. 19 degrees 6 min. W. 64 feet, thence S. 
34 degrees 14 min. W. along the southerly side 
line of Lots 63 and 64, Smith Survey 111 feet to 
northeasterly side line of Lot 65 of Smith Survey, 
thence S. 49 degrees 15 min. E., 16 feet to the S. E. 
corner of said Lot 55, said lot being identical with 
Lot 5, Block 3, Plot "D," Wilkes Official Survey of 
Bingham, thence S. 50 degrees 25 min. W. 50 feet, 
thence S. 40 degrees 40 min. E. 8 feet, thence 44 
degrees 25 min. W. 18 feet, thence S. 46 degrees 
30 min., 10 feet, thence S. 48 degrees 5 min. W. 25 
feet to the west side line of the west half of the east 
half of the N. W. quarter of said Section 26; thence 
south 0 degrees 5 min. along said side line 244 
feet more or less to the place of beginning, con-
taining 3.45 acres more or less. 
3 WHEREFORE, plaintiffs demand judgment 
that the said defendants, their agents, servants, 
and employees, be perpetually enjoined and re-
strained from interfering with the plaintiffs in 
the building of such chutes or other structures 
that may be necessary in the proper extraction 
of said ore, and that they be restrained and 
enjoined from interfering with plaintiffs in the 
removal and extraction of said ores, and that 
plaintiffs have such other and further relief as 
5 
may seem just and equitable, and for their costs 
herein expended. 
(Verification.) 
WILLARD HANSON, 
Attorney for Plaintiffs. 
[TITLE OF COURT AND CAUSE.] 
RESTRAINING ORDER AND ORDER TO 
SHOW CAUSE. 
4 Filed March 3, 1916. 
WHEREAS, in the above entitled cause it ap-
pears from the complaint of the plaintiffs on 
file herein, supported by affidavit, that the plain-
tiffs ·are entitled to all the ore below and in the 
surface of the premises hereinafter described, to-
gether with the right to remove and extract the 
same, and 
WHEREAS, it appears also from said com-
plaint that said plaintiffs have erected and con-
structed ore chutes and other improvements neces-
sary for the proper extraction and removal of said 
ores, and 
WHEREAS, it appears from the allegations 
of said complaint that the defendants have broken 
down and destroyed the said ore chutes and im-
provements, and have threatened to forcibly eject 
and remove the said plaintiffs, their agents, ser-
vants, and employees, from the said premises, and 
have ordered them not to go upon said premises to 
6 
extract ore and remove the same therefrom, and 
have threatened that if the said plaintiffs did go 
upon said premises for the purpose of removinJ;: 
and extracting ore, they, the said defendants, would 
render bodily harm to the said plaintiffs, and 
WHEREAS, plaintiffs pray that the said de-
fendants be restrained and enjoined from tearing 
down and removing the ore chutes and other im-
provements erected thereon by the plaintiffs, and 
interfering with and preventing the plaintiffs from 
going on said premises for the purpose of extract-
5 ing and removing the ore, and pray the court to 
issue an injunction pending the hearing of the 
cause upon its merits, 
NOW, THEREFORE, it is ORDERED, that 
the said defendants, their agents, servants, em-
ployees, and attorneys, be and they are hereby 
restrained and forbidden from tearing down, re-
moving, or destroying any ore chutes or other 
improvements erected by the plaintiffs upon said 
premises for the purpose of removing and extract-
ing said ore, and are restrained and forbidden from 
interfering with the plaintiffs from extracting and 
removing the said ore, and are further restrained 
and forbidden from preventing the plaintiffs' going 
upon said premises for the purpose of removing 
and extracting ores, and are restrained and for-
bidden from interfering with plaintiffs in any 
manner whatsoever in the removal and extracting 
7 
of said ores, all of which the said defendants, 
their agents, servants, employees, and attorneys 
are forbidden and restrained from doing, until 
the 17th day of March, A. D. 1916, and until 
the further order of the court in the premises ; 
and the said defendants are hereby required and 
commanded to show cause before T. D. Lewis, 
one of the Judges of this Court in the Court Room 
thereof, in the City and County Building, at Salt 
Lake City, Utah, at the hour of 2 o'clock P. M. 
of the said last mentioned date, why this restrain-
ing order should not continue in force and effect 
until the hearing of this cause upon its merits. 
It is further ordered that the plaintiffs give 
an undertaking in the sum of $500.00. 
The premises described herein and affected by 
this order are as follows: 
Beginning at the S. W. corner of the west half 
of the east half of the N. W. quarter of Section 26, 
T. 3 S., Range 3 W., S. L. B. and M., thence S. 89 
degrees 55 min. E. 244 feet, thence in 5 degrees E. 
306 feet, thence N. 63 degrees 26 min. W., 59 feet, 
thence N. 23 degrees 7 min. E. 749, thence S. 63 
degrees 26 min. E. 21.5 feet, thence N. 29 degrees 
45 min. E. 162.5 feet, thence N. 2 degrees 45 min. 
W. 70 feet, thence N. 43 degrees 15 min. W. 55 feet, 
thence S. 57 degrees 39 min. 57.5 feet, thence N. 
49 degrees 15 min. W. 40 feet, more or less to the 
easterly corner of Lot 59, Smith Survey, of the 
town of Bingham on Valentine Scrip Entry, thence 
6 S. 41 degrees 48 min. W. along the southerly side 
line of Lots 59, 60 and 61 of said Smith Survey, 
170 feet more or less to easterly corner of Lots 62 
of said Smith Survey, thence S. 27 degrees 55 min. 
8 
W. along the southerly side line of said Lots 52 and 
94 feet to the corner of Lot 63, Smith Survey, 
thence S. 19 degrees 6 min. W. 64 feet, thence S. 
34 degrees 14 min. W. along the southerly side 
line of Lots 63 and 64, Smith Survey 111 feet to 
northeasterly side line of Lot 65 of Smith Survey, 
thence S. 49 degrees 15 min. E., 16 feet to the S. E. 
corner of said Lot 55, said lot being identical with 
Lot 5, Block 3, Plot "D," Wilkes Official Survey of 
Bingham, thence S. 50 degrees 25 min. W. 50 feet, 
thence S. 40 degrees 40 min. E.- 8 feet, thence 44 
degrees 25 min. W. 18 feet, thence S. 46 degrees 
30 min., 10 feet, thence S. 48 degrees 5 min. W. 25 
feet to the west side line of the west half of the east 
half of the N. W. quarter of said Section 26; thence 
south 0 degrees 5 min. along said side line 244 
feet more or less to the place of beginning, con-
taining 3.45 acres more or less. 
Dated March 3rd, 1916. 
By the Court, 
(SEAL) 
T. D. LEWIS, 
Judge. 
Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake Coun-
ty, State of Utah. 
THOS. HOMER, 
Clerk, 
B. F. QUINN, 
Deputy Clerk. 
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(TITLE OF COURT AND CAUSE.] 
AFFIDAVIT. 
11 Filed March 8, 1916. 
STATE OF UTAH, } 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, ss. 
H. C. GOODRICH, being first duly sworn, 
deposes and says that he is an officer of the de-
fendant above-named, Utah Copper Company, to-
wit, the chief engineer thereof; that as such chief 
engineer this affiant is charged with the duty of 
preserving and maintaining the property rights of 
said defendant Utah Copper Company; 
Affiant further states that heretofore and 
on, to-wit, the lOth day of August, 1915, one 
Stephen Hays and Mary A. Hays, his wife, were the 
owners, in the possession and entitled to the posses-
sion of that certain tract of land situate in Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, particularly described 
as follows, to-wit: 
Beginning at the S. W. corner of the west half 
of the east half of the N. W. quarter of Section 26, 
T. 3 S., Range 3 W., S. L. B. and M., thence S. 89 
degrees 55 min. east 244 feet ; thence north 5 de-
grees east 306 feet; thence north 63 degrees 26 
min. west 59 feet; thence north 23 degrees 7 min. 
east 7 4.9 feet; thence south 63 degrees 26 min. east 
27 feet; thence north 25 degrees 4 min. east 61.4 
feet; thence south 63 degrees 26 min. east 21.5 feet; 
thence north 29 degrees 45 min. east 162.5 feet; 
12 thence north 2 degrees 45 min. W. 70 feet, thence 
N. 43 degrees 15 min. W. 55 feet, thence S. 57 
degrees 39 min. W. 57.5 feet, thence N. 49 de-
10 
grees 15 min. W. 40 feet, more or less to the 
easterly corner of Lot 59, Smith Survey, of the 
town of Bingham on Valentine Scrip Entry, thence 
S. 41 degrees 48 min. W. along the southerly side 
line of Lots 59, 60 and 61 of said Smith Survey, 
170 f~t more or less to easterly corner of Lots 62 
of said Smith Survey, thence S. 27 degrees 55 min. 
W. along the southerly side line of said Lot 62 
94 feet to the corner of Lot 63, Smith Survey, 
thence S. 19 degrees 6 min. W. 64 feet, thence S. 
34 degrees 14 min. W. along the southerly side 
line of Lots 63 and 64 Smith Survey 101 feet to 
northeasterly side line of Lot 65 Smith Survey, 
thence S. 49 degrees 15 min. E., 16 feet to the S. E. 
corner of said Lot 65, said lot being identical with 
Lot 5, Block 3, Plot "D," Wilkes Official Survey of 
Bingham, thence S. 50 degrees 25 min. W. 50 feet, 
thence S. 40 degrees 40 min. E. 8 feet, thence S. 44 
degrees 25 min. W. 18 feet, thence S. 46 degrees 30 
min. E 10.5 feet, thence S. 48 degrees 5 min. W. 25 
feet to the west side line of the west half of the east 
half of the N. W. quarter of said Section 2G; thence 
south 0 degrees 5 min. west along said side line 244 
feet more or less to the place. of beginning, con-
taining 3.45 acres more or less. 
That on said date the said Hays and wife for and 
in consideration of the sum of two thousand dol-
lars ($2,000.00) to them in hand paid by one 
George C. Earl, did convey the said premises to 
the said Earl, reserving, however, to themselves, 
their heirs, successors and assigns, the right to 
all ores in and underneath the surface of said 
above-described tract, together with the right to 
mine and remove such ores; that thereafter and 
on the same date the said George C. Earl and 
Flora Earl, his wife, did convey the said premises 
11 
unto the defendant above-named, Utah Copper 
Company, and that the said defendant, Utah Cop-
per Company, did thereupon enter into the posses-
sion of said premises so conveyed to it as aforesaid 
and ever since said date has been in the possession 
and entitled to the possession of said premises 
and the whole thereof: and 
This affiant further alleges that on, to-wit, 
the 25th day of January, 1916, the said Stephen 
Hays did execute and deliver to the plaintiffs 
above-named, as this affiant is informed and be-
lieves and upon such information and belief states 
13 the fact to be so, that certain lease wherein and 
and whereby the said Hays did grant unto the said 
plaintiffs the right to mine, extract and remove 
any ore lying in and underneath the surface area 
of the said premises so theretofore conveyed to 
the said Earl and by the said Earl conveyed to 
the defendant, Utah Copper Company, as afore-
said; that in and by the terms of said lease the 
right of said plaintiffs to mine and extract any 
ores and minerals in or underneath the surface 
area of said premises was by the said Stephen 
Hays granted, expressly subject to the terms and 
conditions of the said deed of conveyance so 
made by him to the said Earl as aforesaid: 
and 
This affiant further states that the said 
plaintiffs, without the consent of the Utah Cop-
per Company and against its will, entered upon 
12 
the said surface area of the said property of 
said defendant, Utah Copper Company, and are 
now in the possession of and are disturbing the 
said surface area and removing surface material 
therefrom: and 
This affiant further states that the said de-
fendant, Utah Copper Company, the owner of 
the said premises as aforesaid, is powerless to 
prevent the said plaintiffs from trespassing upon 
the said property of said defendant company 
and disturbing and destroying the surface area 
thereof, for that heretofore and on, to-wit, the 
3rd day of March, 1916, in the above-entitled 
cause this Honorable Court did improvidently and 
without any hearing whatever, upon the com-
plaint of the plaintiff herein and the affidavit 
made in support thereof, enter its restraining 
order restraining the said defendants herein and 
each of them from in any way interfering with 
the said plaintiffs in their unlawful trespass and 
invasion of the surface area of the property of 
the said defendant, Utah Copper Company, and 
did in and by the terms of said order restrain 
14 the said defendant, Utah Copper Company, and 
its servants, agents and employees, from in any 
way interfering with the said plaintiffs in their 
unlawful and wrongful trespass upon the surface 
area of the property of said defendant, Utah 
Copper Company, and did likewise restrain the 
said defendant, Utah Copper Company, and its 
13 
servants and employees from in any way enjoy-
ing its said property, except subject to the un-
lawful trespass thereon by said plaintiffs: and 
This affiant further states that since the 
issuance of said restraining order the said plain-
tiffs have entered upon the surface area of tht> 
said property of the said defendant, Utah Copper 
Company, and have torn down and destroyed the 
crib or bulk-head erected upon said property by 
said defendants and have placed upon the sairl 
surface area chutes and have been and still are 
destroying the said surface area making cuts and 
excavations thereon and in other ways trespassing 
upon the property and estate of said defendant, 
Utah Copper Company; and that said defendant 
is as aforesaid, due to the improvident order of 
this Honorable Court, prevented from in any 
way resisting the said unlawful entry upon its 
property by said plaintiffs and their trespass there~ 
on: and 
This affiant further states that in order to 
preserve the property of said defendant, Utah 
Copper Company, and to prevent the destruction 
thereof, the said plaintiffs should, pending the 
trial of this cause, be prevented and restrained 
from entering upon said surface area or interfering 
therewith in any way whatever. 
WHEREFORE AFFIANT PRAYS that this 
Honorable Court do make an order enjoining and 
14 
restraining the said plaintiffs and each of them 
from entering upon the surface area so owned by 
said defendant, Utah Copper Company, as afore-
said, and that they and each of them be required 
to refrain from entering upon said surface area 
15 or in any way trespassing thereon, pending the 
trial of this case and until the final determination 
thereof. 
H. C. GOODRICH. 
(Verification.) 
16 COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, } 
S U ss. TATE OF TAH, 
I hereby certify that I received the within and 
hereunto annexed order on the ninth day of March, 
A. D. 1916, and that I personally served the same 
upon the within named plaintiffs, to-wit, F. L. 
Byron and Chas. S. Austin, by delivering to and 
leaving with each a true copy of the within 
and hereunto annexed order upon F. L. Byron, 
at Bingham, Bingham Canyon, Salt Lake County, 
Utah, and Chas. S. Austin, Highland Boy, Bingham 
Canyon, Salt Lake County, Utah, on the ninth day 
of March, A. D. 1916. 
I further certify that at the time of said 
service I endorsed on the copy so served the date 
15 
of service, signed my name thereto, and added 
my official title. 
Dated this Ninth Day of March, A. D. 1916. 
JOHN S. CORLESS, 
Sheriff, Salt Lake County, Utah. 
By JOHN KNUDSEN, 
Deputy Sheriff. 
[TITLE OF COURT AND CAUSE.] 
ORDER. 
17 Filed March 8, 1916. 
Upon reading and filing the answer in the 
above-entitled cause and the affidavit of H. C. 
Goodrich, and it appearing therefrom to the sat-
isfaction of the court that pending the trial 
and the final determination of the above-entitled 
cause, the said plaintiffs and each of them should 
be enjoined and restrained from entering upon 
the surface area of the property and premises 
described in the affidavit of said H. C. Goodrich 
and hereinafter described, and should be enjoined 
and restrained from disturbing such surface area 
or placing any chutes or other works thereon or 
interfering therewith in any way whatever. 
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DE-
CREED that pending the final determination of 
plaintiffs' order to show cause heretofore issued 
and until the further hearing of the court, the 
said plaintiffs and each of them, and each of 
16 
their agents, servants and employees, be and 
they are hereby enjoined and restrained from en-
tering upon the surface area of the land and 
premises hereinafter described or from disturbing 
such surface area or placing any obstructions 
thereon or interfering in any way whatever there-
with the property and premises hereinafter par-
ticularly described as follows, to-wit: 
18 Beginning at the S. W. corner of the west half 
of the east half of the N. W. quarter of Section 26, 
T. 3 S., Range 3 W., S. L. B. and M., thence S. 89 
degrees 55 min. E. 244 feet, thence N. 5 degrees. E. 
306 feet, thence N. 63 degrees 26 min. W., 59 feet, 
thence N. 23 degrees 7 min. E. 74.9 feet, thence S. 63 
degrees 26 min. E. 27 feet, thence N. 25 de-
grees 4 min. E. 61.4 feet, thence S. 63 degrees 
26 min. E. 21.5 feet, thence N. 29 degrees 45 
min. E. 162.5 feet, thence N. 2 degrees 45 min. 
W. 70 feet, thence N. 43 degrees 15 min. W. 55 feet, 
thence S. 57 degrees 39 min. W. 57.5 feet, thence N. 
49 degrees 15 min. W. 40 feet, more or less to the 
easterly corner of L<>t 59, Smith Survey, of the 
town of Bingham on Valentine Scrip Entry, thence 
S. 41 degrees 48 min. W. along the southerly side 
line of Lots 59, 60 and 61 of said Smith Survey, 
170 feet more or less to easterly corner of Lots 62 
of said Smith Survey, thence S. 27 degrees 55 min. 
W. along the southerly side line of said Lot 62 
94 feet to the corner of Lot 63, Smith Survey, 
thence S. 19 degrees 6 min. W. 64 feet, thence S. 
34 degrees 14 min. W. along the southerly side 
line of Lots 63 and 64, Smith Survey, 101 feet to the 
northeasterly side line of Lot 65 Smith Survey, 
thence S. 49 degrees 15 min. E., 16 feet to the S. E. 
corner of said L<>t 55, said lot being identical with 
Lot 5, Block 3, Plot "D," Wilkes Official Survey of 
Bingham, thence S. 50 degrees 25 min. W. 50 feet, 
17 
thence S. 40 degrees 40 min. E. 8 feet, thence S. 44 
degrees 25 min. W. 18 feet, thence S. 46 degrees 
30 min., E. 10.5 feet, thence S. 48 degrees 5 min. W. 
25 feet to the west side line of the west half of the 
east half of the N. W. quarter of said Section 26; 
thence south 0 degrees 5 min. west along said side 
line 244 feet more or less to the place of beginning, 
containing 3.45 acres more or less. 
T. D. LEWIS, 
(SEAL) Judge. 
Attest: 
By: 
THOS. HOMER, 
Clerk. 
B. F. QUINN, 
Deputy Clerk. 
Done in open court this 8th day of March, 
1916. 
[TITLE OF COURT AND CAUSE.] 
ORDER. 
19 Filed May 20, 1916. 
The order to show cause heretofore and on 
the 3rd day of March, A. D. 1916, issued herein 
requiring said defendants to show cause why the 
restraining order issued in connection with said 
order to show cause should not continue in force 
until the hearing and final determination of this 
cause, and the additional restraining order issued 
at the instance of said defendants on the 8th 
day of March, A. D. 1916, restraining plaintiffs 
18 
pending the hearing and final determination of 
plaintiff's order to show cause heretofore issued 
in this cause and until the further order of 
the court from committing the acts therein men-
tioned, having come on to be heard on the 
17th day of March, A. D. 1916, Willard Hanson 
and Charles C. Dey appearing for the plaintiffs, 
and A. C. Ellis and Russell G. Schulder appearing 
for the defendants, and the court having heard 
the evidence adduced by the respective parties and 
the arguments of counsel, and the court being 
fully advised in the premises, 
IT IS NOW HEREBY ORDERED that said 
restraining orders, and each of them, heretofore 
issued herein be, and the same are hereby, modified 
as follows: 
20 1. In respect to the so-called south ore dump, 
situate near the southeast corner of the premises 
bounded and described on plaintiff's Exhibit "4" 
and more particularly described in said restrain-
ing order issued March 8, 1916, the plaintiffs 
and their agents and employees are hereby per-
mitted to enter upon, have access to and remove 
the whole or any part or portion thereof which 
contains ore of any economic or commercial value, 
and provided that in removing the said ore the 
said plaintiff shall not interfere with, remove, 
or in any manner cut into the cribbing surround-
ing said south dump. 
19 
2. In respect to the so-called ore dump, situ-
ate in the northerly portion of the premises bound-
ed and defined on plaintiffs' Exhibit "4" and 
more particularly described in said restraining 
order issued March 8, 1916, the plaintiffs and 
their agents and employees are hereby permitted 
to enter upon, have access to and remove any 
part or portion of the ore or material of any 
economic or commercial value contained in said 
dump and lying northerly of a line or plane, said 
line running from a point which is fifteen (15) 
feet northerly from the northwest corner of the 
wjall or fence designated on said E·xhibit "4" 
by the letter "B," to a point in the cribbing sup-
porting said northerly dump where the line of 
the wall or fence designated upon said Exhibit 
"4" by the letters "B-C" if produced in a north-
westerly direction, would intersect said cribbing, 
and lying northerly of a line drawn fifteen (15) 
feet distant from and parallel to the wall or 
fence designated upon said Exhibit "4" by the 
letters "B-C." 
3. In removing the portions of said dumps 
and each of them valuable for the mineral therein 
contained under the permission as hereinbefore 
defined, the work is to be carried on in such 
a manner as not to include or encroach upon the 
original surface ground underneath the said dumps 
and each of them ; also in such a manner as will 
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21 not interfere with or injure any of the improve-
ments on the premises hereinbefore referred to, 
provided that the cribbing supporting said north-
erly dump shall not be interfered with to a greater 
extent than it has been in the past. The position 
of said dump, lying southerly of the line or plane 
described in paragraph 2 of this order shall not be 
encroached upon, interfered with, or moved in any 
way. 
4. The said plaintiff shall furnish to said 
defendant a true and correct statement of the 
cost of removing the said ore and the coRt of 
transportation, and shall likewise furnish to said 
defendant the settlement sheets showing the smelt-
ing charges and proceeds. 
5. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the 
restraining orders heretofore issued herein, and 
each of them, as herein and hereby modified, shall 
continue in force pending the final determination 
of this action, or until the further order of the 
court in the premises. 
6. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that as a 
condition upon which the said plaintiffs are given 
the right to remove the said ore and material as 
hereinabove specified, they shall execute an under-
taking to be approved by the Judge of this Court 
in the sum of five thousand dollars, and that 
as a condition for a continuance of the restraining 
order heretofore issued on behalf of the said 
21 
defendant as hereinabove provided, that said de-
fendant give an undertaking to be approved by 
the Judge of this Court in the sum of five thous-
and dollars. 
Dated this 20th day of May, A. D. 1916. 
By the court: 
MORRIS L. RITCHIE, Judge. 
Attest: 
THOS. HOMER, Clerk. 
By B. F. QUINN, 
Deputy Clerk. 
(Seal). 
[TITLE OF COURT AND CAUSE.] 
ENTRY OF APPEARANCE. 
22 Filed May 5, 1917. 
Comes now Stephen Hays, impleaded as an 
additional party defendant to the above entitled 
cause, accepts service of the amended complaint 
therein, acknowledges receipt of a copy thereof, 
and hereby enters his appearance thereto, and 
takes ten (10} days from the date hereof within 
which to answer, or otherwise plead, to said amend-
ed complaint. 
Dated this 4th day of May, A. D. 1917. 
BOOTH, LEE, BADGER & RICH, 
Attorneys for Stephen Hays. 
.22 
[TITLE OF COURT AND CAUSE.] 
AMENDED COMPLAINT. 
23 Filed May 5, 1917. 
Come now the plaintiffs above named, and by 
leave of court first had and obtained, file this their 
amended complaint, and complaining of the de-
fendants allege: 
1. That the defendant, Utah Copper Com-
pany, is now and at all times hereinafter men-
tioned wa~ tt corporation organized and existing 
under and by virtue of the laws of the State of 
New Jersey. 
2. That on and prior to the lOth day of Aug-
ust, A. D. 1915, said defendant, Stephen Hays, 
was the owner, in possession and entitled to the 
possession of the following described property, 
situate in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, to-wit: 
Beginning at the S. W. corner of the west half 
of the east half of the N. W. quarter of Section 26, 
T. 3 S., Range 3 W., S. L. B. and M., thence S. 89 
degrees 55 min. E. 244 feet, thence N. 5 degrees E. 
306 feet, thence N. 63 degrees 26 min. W., 59 feet, 
thence N. 23 degrees 7 min. E. 74.9, thence S. 63 
degrees 26 min. E. 27 feet, thence N. 25 degrees 
24 4 min. E. 61.4 feet, thence S. 63 degrees 26 
min. E. 21.5 feet, thence N. 29 degrees 45 min. 
E. 162.5 feet, thence N. 2 degrees 45 min. W. 70 
feet, thence N. 43 degrees 15 min. W. 55 feet, thence 
S. 57 degrees 39 min. W. 57.5 feet, thence N. 
49 degrees 15 min. W. 40 feet, more or less to the 
easterly corner of Lot 59, Smith Survey, of the 
town of Bingham on Valentine Scrip Entry, thence 
23 
S. 41 degrees 48 min. W. along the southerly side 
line of Lots 59, 60 and 61 of said Smith Survey, 
170 feet more or less to easterly corner of Lots 62 
of said Smith Survey, thence S. 27 degrees 55 min. 
W. along the southerly side line of said Lot 62 
94 feet to the corner of Lot 63, Smith Survey, 
thence S. 19 degrees 6 min. W. 64 feet, thence S. 
34 degrees 14 min. W. along the southerly side 
line of Lots 63 and 64, Smith Survey 101 feet to the 
northeasterly side line of Lot 65 of Smith Survey, 
thence S. 49 degrees 15 min. E., 16 feet to the S. E. 
corner of said lot 65, said lot being identical with 
Lot 5, Block 3, Plot "D," Wilkes Official Survey of 
Bingham, thence S. 50 degrees 25 min. W. 50 feet, 
thence S. 40 degrees 40 min. E. 8 feet, thence S. 44 
degrees 25 min. W. 18 feet, thence S. 46 degrees 
30 min., E. 10.5 feet, thence S. 48 degrees 5 min. W. 
25 feet to the west side line of the west half of the 
east half of the N. W. quarter of said Section 26;. 
thence south 0 degrees 5 min. west along said side 
line 244 feet more or less to the place of beginning, 
containing 3.45 acres more or less. 
3. That on said last mentioned date, said 
defendant, Stephen Hays, together with his wife, 
by quit claim deed conveyed said premises to the 
defendant, George C. Earl; said grantors, however, 
in said quit claim deed and conveyance, expressly 
reserving to themselves, their heirs, successors and 
assigns, the right to all ores in and underneath 
the surface area of the property hereinabove in 
paragraph 2 hereof described, together with the 
right to mine and remove the same, provided said 
mining operations of said grantors should not 
endanger any building or buildings, or improve-
ments then, or thereafter erected on a portion of 
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the surface area of said property, by reason of sink-
ing or caving of the surface of said area, caused 
by said mining operation ; said portion of the 
surface of said area being described as follows, 
to-wit: 
Beginning at a point which bears North 22 
degrees 30 min E. 269 feet, from the Southwest 
corner of the west half of the east half of the 
Northwest quarter of said Section 26; thence N. 
17 degrees 30 min. E. 236 feet; thence South 72 
degrees 30 min. E. 100 feet; thence South 17 de-
grees 30 min. West, 236 feet; thence North 72 
degrees 30 min. West, 100 feet to the beginning. 
And said grantors also reserving the right to use 
any wagon road which might be constructed in 
25 the future by said grantees over said property de-
scribed in paragraph 2. 
4. That thereafter and on or about the 25th 
day of January, A. D. 1916, said defendant, Stephen 
Hays, by written mining lease, granted, demised 
and let to the plaintiffs herein said property herein-
above, in paragraph 2 hereof, described, together 
with other property; to have and to hold the same 
unto the said plaintiffs for the term of two years 
from said last mentioned date, expiring at noon 
on the 25th day of January A. D. 1918, unless 
sooner forfeited through the violation of any of 
the covenants therein against the said lessees 
reserved. And in consideration of said lease and 
demise, the plaintiffs herein covenanted and agreed 
with said defendant, Stephen Hays, among other 
things, to commence work at once, mining said 
leased property and to work the same in a good 
and workmanlike manner, steadily and continu-
ously from the date of said lease and that a failure 
to work said premises with at least two persons 
for twenty-five (25) days in each calendar month, 
after the first month in which said lease was 
made, might, at the option of said Stephen Hays, 
be considered a violation of said covenant; also 
to pay and deliver to said defendant, Stephen Hays, 
as royalty, twenty per cent of the net value of 
all ore extracted from said premises during the 
life of said lease. 
5. That in said lease it was expressly pro-
vided that the plaintiff should in all respects 
abide by and conform to the restrictions upon 
said mining, contained in said deed from the said 
defendant, Stephen Hays and wife, to the defend~ 
ant, George C. Earl, and the reservations and 
proviso contained in said deed as hereinabove set 
forth, were expressly set out and referred to in 
said lease, and it was further covenanted and 
agreed in said lease that for breach of any coven-
ant or stipulation therein, said defendant, Stephen 
Hays, as lessor, might declare said lease at an end. 
26 6. That during the month of February, A. D. 
1916, the defendants, Utah Copper Company, John 
Knudson and George C. Earl, unlawfully and 
26 
wrongfully and without the consent of the plaint-
iffs, forcibly entered upon said premises here-
inabove in paragraph 2 described, and upon the 
portion thereof where the plaintiffs, under said 
lease, were engaged in mining and removing the 
ores in and underneath the surface of said prop-
erty, and did tear, break down, destroy and remove 
certain chutes and other property which the 
plaintiffs had constructed upon said premises for 
the purpose of removing said ore as aforesaid, 
and for which ·purpose the plainfiffs were using 
said chutes. And that said last named defendants, 
did then and there order the plaintiffs to desist 
from removing any ore from said premises and 
claimed and still claim that said plaintiffs had 
not and have not the right to remove all, or any, 
of the ore from the property in paragraph 2 above 
described, or from any part thereof. 
That said last named defendants then stated 
and threatened that they would forcibly eject and 
remove the plaintiffs, their agents, servants and 
employees, from said premises, if the plaintiffs or 
either of them attempted to remove, or extract any 
ore from said premises, and that said defendants 
now claim the right to so eject and remove the 
plaintiffs, their agents, servants and employees, 
from said premises, if said plaintiffs or either of 
them attempt to remove or extract any ore from 
said premises. 
7. That in said month of February, A. D. 
1916, and after tearing down and removing said 
chutes, as aforesaid, said last named defendants 
stated and threatened that they would prevent the 
plaintiffs from placing or erecting any chutes or 
anything else on said premises for the purpose of 
removing any of the ore in and underneath the 
surface area of said property, and that said de-
27 fendants would continue to eject and remove the 
plaintiffs if they went upon said premises for the 
purpose of removing or extracting said ore, and 
if necessary would render bodily harm to the 
plaintiffs and each of them. 
8. That plaintiffs are informed and believe 
and therefore allege, that said defendants will carry 
out said threats and will continue to harass and 
annoy the plaintiffs, destroy planitiffs' property 
and prevent the plaintiffs from mining said prop-
erty in a good and workmanlike manner, or other-
wise, and prevent the plaintiffs from removing 
all, or any, of the ore from all and every part· 
of the premises described in said lease as weli as 
the premises described in paragraph 2 hereof, 
and will prevent the plaintiffs from working said 
property steadily and continuously during the term 
of said lease, or otherwise, unless restrained by the 
decree and order of this court, and will put plain-
tiffs to the necessity of bringing a multiplicity of 
actions at law to protect their rights in the prem-
ises. 
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That unless said defendants are so restrained, 
the plaintiffs will suffer irreparable injury and 
will be prevented from carrying out the covenants 
and conditions, on their part to be performed, under 
the terms of said lease and will be subject to the 
liabilities resulting from such failure, as in said 
lease provided. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray judgment 
against the defendants: 
1. That it be adjudged and decreed that the 
plaintiffs, during the life of said lease and until 
the 25th day of January, 1918, have the right to 
all ores in and underneath the surface area of the 
property described in paragraph 2 hereof, together 
with the right to mine and remove the same, pro-
vided the mining operations of said plaintiffs 
shall not endanger any building or buildings or 
improvements erected, or that may be erected, on 
that portion of said surface area particularly de-
28 described in paragraph 3 hereof, by reason of sink-
ing or caving of the surface of said portion of 
said surface area caused by said mining opera-
tions and that as to all other portions of the sur-
face of said property described in said lease and 
paragraph 2 hereof, the plaintiffs are under no 
obligation to avoid endangering any building, build-
ings or improvements that are now on said sur-
face or that may hereafter be erected thereon. 
2. That the defendants, Utah Copper Com-
pany, John Knudson and George C. Earl, and each 
of them, and their agents, servants and employees, 
be enjoined and restrained, during the term of said 
lease from in any manner interfering with the 
plaintiffs or either of them, in the building of 
such chutes or other structures as may be necessary 
or proper in the extraction of ore from said prem-
ises and all parts thereof, and from interfering 
with the plaintiffs, or either of them, in the re-
moval and extraction of said ore. 
3. For such other and further relief as to 
the court may seem just and for costs of suit. 
WILLARD HANSON AND DEY, 
HOPPAUGH & FABIAN, 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs. 
(Verification.) 
Copy received and service accepted and we 
hereby consent that the foregoing amended com-
plaint may be filed, this 4th day of May A. D. 
1917. 
ELLIS, SCHULDER & LUCAS, 
Attorneys for Defendants Utah Copper Co., 
John Knudson and George C. Earl. 
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[TITLE OF COURT AND CAUSE.] 
ANSWER OF STEPHEN HAYS IMPLEADED 
AS AN ADDITIONAL PARTY 
DEFENDANT. 
29 Filed May 14, 1917. 
Comes now Stephen Hays, impleaded as an 
additional party defendant in the above entitled 
action, and for an answer to the amended com-
plaint filed therein admits and alleges as follows, 
to-wit: 
I. 
This defendant admits each and every allega-
tion contained in said amended complaint. 
II. 
For a further answer to said complaint this 
defendant alleged upon information and belief 
that the allegations contained in paragraphs six, 
seven and eight of plaintiffs' amended complaint, 
are true and by reason of the acts therein set 
forth this defendant's lessees have been unlawfully, 
wrongfully and forcibly prevented from mining 
30 on said premises and removing the ore therefrom, 
and that by reason thereof this defendant has 
been deprived of the royalties upon said ores, 
to-wit, twenty (20%) per cent of the net value 
of all ore extracted from said premises during the 
life of said lease; that there is a great demand in 
the market for the ores contained in said described 
31 
premises, and that the prices therefor are now 
and have been for some time past much higher 
than that usually paid for the kind of ores con-
tained in said property, and the prices for said 
ores are liable to fall; and that by reason of the 
said unlawful and wrongful acts of the said defend-
ants, the Utah Copper Company, John Knudson 
and George C. Earl, this defendant will suffer 
irreparable injury and will be prevented from 
receiving the royalties to which he is lawfully 
and justly entitled, and that unless the said 
defendants above mentioned are restrained and 
enjoined from interfering with the extraction of 
said ores in said premises, this defendant will 
suffer great and irreparable loss and injury, and 
will be prevented from receiving the royalties upon 
said ores as aforesaid. 
WHEREFORE, this defendant prays judgmenJ 
against the above mentioned defendants as prayed 
for in the plaintiff's amended complaint. 
BOOTH, LEE, BADGER & RICH, 
Attorneys for defendant Stephen Hays. 
(Verification.) 
[TITLE OF COURT AND CAUSE.] 
ANSWER. 
32 Filed June 12, 1917. 
Now comes the Utah Copper Company, a 
corporation, and John Knudson and George C. 
32 
Earl, the defendants above-named, and for answer 
to the amended complaint of the plaintiffs on 
file herein, 
I. 
Admit the allegations contained in paragraphs 
nmbered 1, 2 and 3 of said amended complaint. 
II. 
Answering paragraph numbered 4 of said 
amended complaint, these defendants deny each 
and evey allegation therein contained; but these 
defendants admit that the said impleaded defendant 
Stephen Hays did on or about the 25th day of 
January, 1916, make, execute and deliver to the 
plaintiffs herein a certain so-called mining lease 
33 and bond, a copy of which is hereto annexed, 
marked Exhibit "A," and made a part of this 
answer. 
III. 
Answering paragraph numbered 5 of said 
amended complaint, these defendants allege that 
all the terms, conditions and provisions contained 
in the said lease are as set forth and contained 
in the said Exhibit "A" hereto annexed and 
marked Exhibit "A" as aforesaid, and not other-
wise. 
IV. 
Answering paragraphs numbered 6, 7 and 
8 of said amended complaint, these defendants 
33 
deny each and every allegation in each of said 
paragraphs contained. 
Further answering said complaint, these de-
fendants deny each and every allegation therein 
contained, not herein specifically admitted or 
denied. 
And for a further answer to said amended 
complaint and by way of answer to the answer 
of the impleaded defendant, Stephen Hays, these 
defendants allege that they are informed and be-
lieve and upon such information and belief allege 
the fact to be that said plaintiffs have not now, 
nor has either of them, any estate, title, or inter-
est whatever in or to the said lease heretofore 
given and granted to them by the said Stephen 
Hays; but to the contrary thereof have sold, as-
signed, set over and delivered all of their estate, 
right, title and interest of, in and to said lease, and 
all rights growing out of and arising out of the 
same, to one C. H. Thompson, who now claims to 
be the owner of said lease and all rights there-
under. 
34 And these defendants furthere allege that 
they are informed and believe and upon such 
information and belief allege the fact to be, that 
the said impleaded defendant Stephen Hays is 
not now and has not been for several months last 
past the owner of any part or portion of any 
ores or minerals contained underneath the sur-
34 
face of the premises described in the complaint 
herein as having been conveyed by the said Hays 
to the said defendant George Earl, and is not 
now and has not been for several months last 
past the owner, in the possession, or entitled to 
the possession of any part or portion of any 
premises whatever heretofore at any time by 
him leased to said plaintiffs herein; but to the 
contrary thereof, has sold, and conveyed said 
premises and all of his estate, right, title and 
interest therein or thereto unto the Montana-Bing-
ham Consolidated Mining Company, a corpora-
tion. 
And these defendants allege that by reason of 
the premises, neither the plaintiffs, or either of 
them, nor the said impleaded defendant Stephen 
Hays, are the real parties in interest in this action 
and that they have no right to maintain or prose-
cute this action. 
And for answer to the alleged answer of th~, 
impleaded defendant Stephen Hays, these defend·· 
ants deny each and every affirmative allegation 
in said answer contained, except as to such allega-
tions which are hereinbefore in this answer ex-
pressly admitted. 
And these defendants specifically deny each 
and every allegation of said answer contained in 
paragraph numbered 2 thereof. 
WHEREFORE, having fully answered, these 
35 
defendants pray to be hence dismissed with their 
costs of suit in this behalf incurred. 
35 (Verification.) 
ELLIS, SCHULDER & LUCAS, 
Attorneys for Defendants. 
EXHIBIT "A." 
MINING LEASE AND BOND. 
36 THIS INDENTURE, made the 25th day of 
January, 1916, between S. Hays of Salt Lake City, 
Utah, Lessor, and F. L. Byron and Charles Austin, 
both of Bingham, Lessee, 
WITNESSETH 
That the said Lessor for and in consideration 
of the royalties, covenants and agreements here-
inafter reserved and by the said Lessee to be paid, 
kept and performed, and ha. . granted, demised and 
let unto the said Lessee all the following described 
mine. . . and mining property, situated in West 
Mountain Mining District, County of Salt Lake, 
State of Utah, described as 
A parcel of land between Main Bingham Can-
yon and Carr Fork and extending from City Water 
Tank to Meyers (or Mayers) hotel. In mining 
on said land said lessees shall not endanger any 
building on said land or improvements thereon 
and shall in all respects abide by and conform 
to the restrictions upon said mining contained 
in deed recorded on page 327, Book 7-F of Deeds, 
Records of Salt Lake County, 
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together with the appurtenances; to have and to 
hold unto the said Lessee for the term of two 
years from the date hereof, expiring at noon of 
the 25th day of January, 1918, unless sooner 
forfeited through the violation of any covenant 
hereinafter against the said Lessee reserved. 
AND IN CONSIDERATION of the said demise 
the said Lessee do. . covenant and agree with the 
said Lessor. . as follows, to-wit: 
FIRST-To commence work at once upon said 
mine, and work the same in a good and workman-
like manner, working the aforesaid premises stead-
ily and continuously from the date hereof; and 
37 that a failure to work said premises with at 
least 2 person. . for 25 days in each calendar 
month, after the first month in which indenture 
is made, may at the option of Lessor. . be con-
sidered a violation of this covenant. 
SECOND-To timber said mine, when and 
w}lere necessary, at Lessee's own expense. 
THIRD-To allow the said Lessor .. or ...... . 
agent .. to enter upon and into all parts of said mine 
for the purpose of inspection. 
FOURTH-To not assign this Lease, or any in-
terest thereunder, or sublet the same, or any part 
thereof, without the written consent of said Les-
sor ... 
FIFTH-To pay and deliver to said Lessor .. 
or to . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . agent. . , as royalty, 
37 
twenty per cent of the net value of all ore ex-
tracted from said premises during the life of this 
Lease. Net value means after the costs of trans-
portation from mine to smelter or · sampler, and 
sampling and assaying charges have first been 
deducted, then the royalty as aforesaid to be paid 
to Lessor. . or his agent. 
SIXTH-To deliver up to said Lessor. . the 
said premises with the appurtenances, and all 
improvements, including in good order and con-
38 dition, without demand or further notice, on said 
25th day of January, 1918, at noon, or at any 
time previous, upon demand for forfeiture. 
Said deed recorded on page 327 of Book F-7 of 
Deeds, in office of County Recorder, Salt Lake 
County, Utah, and herein referred to, contains 
the following restriction: 
Page 327, Book B of Deeds 1915, Aug. 10. 
Said grantors reserve to themselves, their 
heirs, successors and assigns, the right to all ores 
in and underneath the surface area hereinbefore 
described, together with the right to mine and 
remove same; provided, said mining operation of 
said grantors shall not endanger buildings or 
buildings or improvements now or hereafter erected 
on a portion of the surface area hereinabove de-
scribed, by reason of the sinking or caving ir. of 
the surface area caused by said mining operations. 
Said portion being described as follows, to-wit: 
Beginning at a point which bears N. 22 de. 
grees 30 min. E. 269 feet from S. W. corner of the: 
Wlf2 of Elf2 of N. W. 1,4 of said Section 26; 
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Thence N. 17 degrees 30 min. E. 236 feet; 
thence S. 72 degrees 30 min. E. 100 feet; thence 
S. 17 degrees 30 min. W. 236 feet; thence N. 72 
degrees 30 min. W. 100 feet to beginning. 
Also reserves the right to the use of any 
w:agon road which may be constructed over the 
ground conveyed 10 day of August, 1915. 
GEo. E. EARL. 
39 Each and every clause and covenant of this 
indenture shall extend to the assigns, heirs, ex-
ecutors and administrators of all parties hereto. 
For breach of any covenant or stipulation here-
in said lessor may declare this lease at an end. 
Lessees may use any and all roads on land. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the said parties, 
Lessor. . and Lessee .. , have hereunto set their 
hands and seals, in duplicate, the day and year 
aforesaid. 
(Signed) 
(Signed) 
S. HAYS. 
F. L. BYRON, 
(Signed) CHAS. S. AUSTIN. 
Signed in the presence of 
(Signed) A. S. WILLETT. 
[TITLE OF CoURT AND CAUSE.] 
DECISION. 
40 Filed Sept. 5, 1917. 
(SEAL) 
(SEAL) 
(SEAL) 
There is practically but one question involved 
in this action; i. e., the rights of the respective 
parties, dependent on the meaning of the follow-
ing language in the deed, and which was incor-
39 
porated in the lease. Stephen Hays impleaded on 
August lOth, 1915; he then being the owner, 
executed a quit claim deed to George Earl to an 
irregular tract, lying near the forks, and between 
the main canyon, on one side, and Carr Fork, 
on the other. Earl was acting for the defendant, 
Utah Copper Company, and on the same day sold 
the property to said company. The deed from 
Hays to Earl granted the fee and contained thr 
following reservation; "The grantor reserves all 
the ores in and underneath the surface area, to-
gether with the right to mine and remove the 
same." Then follows a proviso that in mining and 
removing the ores, the grantors should not en-
danger any buildings or improvements thereon, 
or that should thereafter be erected on, a certain 
portion of said land, which was also described by 
metes and bounds, and was rectangular in form. 
Defendant, Utah Copper Company, entered into 
the possession, and commenced the erection of some 
residences on the portion referred to in the pro-
viso; three houses were constructed within the 
41 said rectangle, one partly within and partly without, 
and one entirely without, towards the northerly 
end, and a concrete retaining wall built partly with-
in, and partly without. The tract embraced in 
the proviso, was referred to during the trial, as 
the restricted area, and for convenience will be 
hereafter referred to under the letters R. A., which 
means either restricted area, or rectangular area. 
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January 25th, 1916, Hays leased the entire 
tract to the plaintiffs, Byron and Austin, for a 
term of two years; the lease was conditioned that 
the lessees, in mining and removing the ore, should 
not endanger any buildings or improvements then 
on the entire tract described in the deed to Earl. 
The lease also copied the proviso in the deed with 
reference to the R. A. 
As I recall the testimony, it is left doubtful 
whether the north house, beyond the R. A. was 
constructed at the date of the lease. Some 
time after the execution of the lease, another resi-
dence known as the "Schilling" house was con-
structed off the R. A., to the south. Counsel for 
the respective parties practically agreed that the 
word "ores," as used in the deeds and lease, meant 
mineral of a commercial value; considerable oral 
evidence was introduced tending to prove the ex-
istence of pay ores near, and in some instances, 
outcropping, at the surface. Testimony was also 
given, over the objection of the defendant, that 
pay ores were mined there by one Hoster, under 
a lease from Hays, in 1907, portions of it being 
mined by caving the surface, the evidence also 
shows that at the date of the deed and lease, the 
defendant, Utah Copper Company, was extensively 
engaged in surface mining, or quarrying, in the 
immediate vicinity of the ground in question; that 
such method was the most practical and economical, 
41 
42 and the only method by which low grade copper 
ores could be mined and smelted at a profit. The 
conversations that occurred between Hays and Earl, 
before the execution of the deed, were also allowed 
to be given in evidence, not for the purpose of 
varying, or contradicting, the terms of the deed, 
but to put the court, as far as possible, in the 
situation of the parties, at the time the deed was 
executed. For the purposes of this decision, Hays, 
who was impleaded as a defendant, at the request 
of the plaintiffs, the lessees, will be referred to as 
a plaintiff. Counsel for plaintiffs contend that 
the language contained in the reservation, "in and 
underneath the surface," comprehends all com-
mercial ores contained in the fee granted, and 
that the grantor and his lessees had the rtght 
to mine and remove the same, provided they did 
not endanger any buildings or improvements on 
the R. A. They also claim the ownership of the 
ore (if any) removed in excavating for the founda-
tion of the houses, and placed in the two dumps, 
and the right to remove and dispose of the same, 
and to cut the cribbing supporting the dumps, if 
necessary, in order to effect such removal. They 
further contend that they have the right to mine 
and dispose of the ore, outside of the R. A., even 
though by so doing, the houses, constructed outside 
of the R. A., should be injured or destroyed. Coun-
sel for defendants contend that the language of 
the reservation means, all ores within the exterior 
42 
boundaries of the tract conveyed, and underneath 
the "surface," rejecting the word "area" in that 
construction, as meaningless; they also contend that 
having title to the fee, the defendants have the 
right to construct houses outside of the R. A., 
and to have sub-jacent support for the same, and 
that in removing the ores plaintiffs have no right 
to injure or destroy such houses, or sub-jacent 
support for the same; they also deny the ownership 
43 by the plaintiffs of the ores in the dumps and 
specifically the right to cut the cribbing in order 
to remove the same, from the north dump, because 
it would injure that part of the concrete retaining 
wall, which was constructed outside the R. A. 
Extensive briefs have been filed on both sides, 
and many cases cited to explain the meaning of 
the language of the deed, and lease, both as to 
the ores reserved, and as to the right to mine and 
remove the same. In practically all these cases the 
rights of the grantor, where the fee was granted 
and the mineral reserved, or the mineral was granted 
and the fee reserved, were determined with refer-
ence to the common understanding, and practice 
with reference thereto. 
The correct solution of the questions involved, 
is not so simple a matter as appears from a casual 
reading of the deed, and is one upon which men 
learned in the law might honestly differ. The de-
cision is important to the plaintiffs, Hays and his 
lessees, by reason of the value of the ores, and to 
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the defendant, Utah Copper Company, by reason of 
the value of the houses, and other improvements 
already constructed, and the right it claims to con-
struct other houses, or make such other use of the 
surface as it may, in future desire. The court has 
given considerable time and study to the questions, 
and examined most of the text books and authorities 
cited. Counsel for the respective parties practically 
agree upon the general principles and rules applic-
able to the construction of the deed and lease. Plain-
tiffs' counsel, at page 4 of their brief, state them 
in the following language: "In construing private 
conveyances, it is apparent that each case must 
be decided upon the language of the grant, or 
reservation, the surrounding circumstances, and 
the intention of the grantor, if it can be ascer-
44 tained." And counsel for defendants, at page 7 
of their brief, state them as follows: "1. The 
object in construing a deed is to ascertain the 
intention of the parties. 
"2. And to that end, the instrument must be 
construed according to the mind and intent of 
the parties, at the time it was executed, and 
accordingly, all the material circumstances known 
to the parties, are to be taken into consideration 
by the court, in construing doubtful expressions 
in a deed." 
In determining the meaning of the written 
contract, the primary factor, as stated by defend-
ant's counsel, is, "to ascertain the intention of 
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the parties." To ascertain that intention, recourse 
must be had to the whole instrument, and proper 
effect given to every word, phrase and sentence. 
The court should also be placed, as far as possible, 
in the situation of the parties, at the time of the 
execution of the deed. Counsel for defendant, in 
their brief, state their contention as follows: 
"Clearly the ore in contemplation of the parties, 
was the mineral in situ, underlying the surface, 
and to be found beneath the bed rock. The parties 
clearly had reference to the ore as found in the 
metalifferous rock in place, distinct from the sur-
face debris, slide, alluvium or wash." In my 
opinion, to interpret the language of the reserva-
tion, as contended for by defendant's counsel, 
requires a strained and unnatural meaning to be 
given to the language used. To my mind, the 
plain and ordinary meaning is that the grantor 
"reserved all the ores." To obtain the meaning 
claimed by defendant's counsel, it is necessary to 
either read into the instrument other, and addi-
tional words, not used, or to transpose the words 
used, and eliminate a part that were used. To 
construe the reservation, as claimed by counsel 
for defendant, is to disregard the word "in" 
entirely. Counsel argued that it means the "ores 
in the area hereinbefore described and underneath 
the surface." To express this intention, it was 
wholly unnecessary to use the words "in," and 
45 "and." If the language used had been "reserves 
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the right to all ores underneath the surface here-
inbefore described," that would have conveyed the 
meaning claimed by defendant. I think the plain 
meaning is, all the ores "in" the surface, and 
"underneath" the surface. The meaning of this 
clause becomes important, taken in connection with 
the "right to mine and remove the same," i. e., 
all the ores, both in and underneath the surface, 
in determining the question of a waiver of the 
right to sub-jacent support, hereinafter discussed. 
Again, as was suggested by the court during the 
oral argument, it would seem to be wholly un-
necessary to reserve the ores contained within 
the exterior boundaries, for the reason that the 
grantor, of course, could not reserve ores that 
were without the exterior boundaries. In answer 
to that suggestion, counsel for defendant suggests 
that there might possibly be a. vein apexing within 
such boundaries. If that were true, the effect 
of the meaning contended for by defendant, would 
be to prevent the grantor from following such 
vein on its dip, outside the exterior boundaries, 
which the grantor would not be likely to have 
intended. 
Another fact that militates against the claim 
of the defendant, is that the ores, whatever may 
be their value, outcropped in places at the surface, 
and the parties must be held to have contracted 
with reference to that fact. In arriving at the 
intention of the parties, it is necessary to consider 
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the methods of mining in the district, and in the 
immediate vicinity of the property in question. 
The language used in this deed would not mean 
the same under all circumstances and conditions. 
The world moves; conditions change; new dis-
coveries spell progress; new inventions mean new, 
and different methods. The law of common car-
riers, as applied to stage coach and canal boat, 
would not fit, or apply to steam and electric 
railroads, nor ocean liners. The language used 
46 in this deed, if the deed were executed in a 
mining district where all mining was carried on 
underground, might well be held to mean that in 
mining and removing the ores, neither the actual 
surface, nor the sub-jacent support, should be 
disturbed. But such language used in a district 
where, for many years, surface mining for low 
grade copper ores had been constantly in use 
by miners generally, and on this particular tract, 
by plaintiffs, and was the method first inaugur-
ated and carried to success by defendant corpora-
tion, and in actual operation at the date of the 
deed, by defendant, and the further fact, which 
is practically conceded, and certainly demonstrated 
by the evidence, that such method is more practi-
cal, more economical, and in fact the only method 
by which the mining of ore, such as is shown to 
exist in the ground in question, can be success-
fully carried on, must be held to mean that the 
parties to the deed in question, understood that 
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such method was to be used by the grantor, or 
his successor in interest. If we look at the con-
versations between Hays and Earl, as testified 
to by both, it seems clear that such was in fact 
their understanding. 
This brings us to consider the doctrine of sub-
jacent support, so earnestly contended for by 
defendant's counsel. The doctrine had its origin 
in England, and in the early decisions it was 
held, that in all grants or reservations of ores 
or minerals, there was a presumption of sub-jacent 
support. This general doctrine has been fol-
lowed generally by the courts of this country; 
even the case of Griffin vs. Fairmount Coal Com-
pany, relied on by plaintiffs' counsel, concedes it, 
but the majority opinion holds that it was waived 
by the language of the grant. It is there in effect 
held that there is no such presumption, and that 
each grant, or reservation, should be construed, 
like any other contract, according to the intention 
of the parties, as disclosed by the language used. 
It is unnecessary to discuss this doctrine at length, 
47 for the reason that counsel for the plaintiffs 
concede the principle, but deny its application in 
this case. It is also held by the weight of 
authority, both in England and in this country, 
that this right may be waived, either expressly, 
or by implication. As said in Gordon vs. Delaware, 
etc., R. Co. (Pa.), 97 Atlantic 1032; "Right of 
surface support can be waived by an implied, as 
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well as an express covenant, and it is so implied 
by the acceptance of a grant offered upon terms 
unmistakably intended to extinguish the right." 
"It follows, therefore, that where the terms of the 
instrument by which the severance of the two 
estates was effected, are shown, the general doc-
trine of implied right to sub-jacent support, does 
not alone determine the right of the parties; but 
the question arises whether or not the right of sup-
port has been released or waived by the instrument 
under consideration, and in determining this ques-
tion, the general rule is, that the right will be 
held waived only by express, or apt words, in the 
conveyance, or by the clearest implication. Such 
seems to be the rule in Pennsylvania, where the 
subject of surface support has received more con-
sideration than in any other states." (Sherwin, 
Justice, in Collins vs. Gleason Co., 115 N. W. 497.) 
Was it waived in this case? Adverting to the 
second rule stated by counsel for the defendant, 
at page 7 of their brief, "and to that end the 
instrument must be construed according to the 
mind and intent of the parties at the time it was 
executed, and accordingly, all the material circum-
stances known to the parties are to be taken into 
consideration by the court, in construing doubtful 
expressions in a deed." One of the important and 
material circumstances to be construed, is the 
method of mining in common use at the date of 
the deed, in the vicinity of the property in ques-
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tion. In many, and probably most of the cases 
cited, the particular manner or method of mining 
ores is specified in the grant or reservation. Here, 
48 no method is mentioned. It must, therefore, 
follow, under the rule above quoted, that the 
method or manner in common use in that vicinity 
must have been intended, and was, in law, in 
contemplation of the parties to the deed. That 
method, as to this class of low grade copper ores, 
was by mining (caving and sinking) from the 
surface. The right to mine and remove the ore 
in the surface, and the right to sub-jacent support, 
cannot both exist at the same time; the one is 
destructive of the other. I think the proper con-
struction of the deed is that the grantee obtained 
a title in fee to all the described area; and the 
grantor reserving title to all the ores; that as to 
the R. A., the grantee obtained the absolute pro-
tection from danger by the mining operations of 
the grantor, or his lessees; and as to the balance 
outside the R. A., the grantee obtained the fee 
in such condition as it should be left in by the nec-
essary operations of the grantor, or his lessees, 
in mmmg and removing the ores, "in and under-
neath the surface," by the usual and ordinary 
methods in vogue in that vicinity. Counsel for 
defendant, however, argues that the proviso refers 
only to damage by "caving or sinking." But if 
the grantor had no right to damage the surface, 
in any manner, or at all, the greater would in-
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elude the less, and the grantee would obtain no 
additional protection by the language of the pro-
viso, and it would be practically meaningless. 
The question then is, does the reservation of 
the right to mine and remove the ore in the surface, 
and the proviso with reference to the R. A., in 
effect amount to a waiver of the right to sub-
jacent support of the surface as to the area outside 
of the R. A., which, as a general rule, obtains in all 
grants or reservations of minerals? Under the 
facts and circumstances of this case, I think it 
does. It seems to me that the proviso is a 
limitation defining the extent of the right to which 
sub-jacent support should be applied. As to the 
49 R. A., the grantor guaranteed to so mine and 
remove the ore, as not to endanger the buildings 
or improvements then, or thereafter, to be con-
structed thereon. If the contention of counsel 
for the defendant should prevail, then the proviso 
gives defendant no additional right, and should 
be rejected, which violates one of the principal 
tenets of construction. But treating the proviso 
as defining and limiting the right of sub-jacent 
support, gives it proper meaning and effect, and 
harmonizes with the purposes and intention of 
the parties, as disclosed by the conversations that 
took place before the execution of the deed. .tlays 
testified that he was familiar with the ground 
ever since he had been in Bingham; that ore was 
exposed in pretty nearly all the ground, and 
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cropped out at, and above the surface; that Hostel 
did surface mining. Earl testified: "We had 
been trying to find place to construct houses on 
this ground, if we could get proper provisions; 
when I went to see Hays, I had a blue print show-
ing the contour of the ground in controversy. I 
first put the proposition up to him (Hays) that 
we wanted to buy all the title; he said he would sell 
the surface. He wanted to reserve some ground 
on the Bingham Canyon side, from which he 
might work the property. He mentioned two kinds 
of ore; he said Hoster had taken out valuablt> 
sulphide ore, and said 'some day I expect to have 
a mine.' He also mentioned lead ores; he asked 
me why we wanted so much ground, and I told 
him we might want to put up a number of build· 
ings. He said he wanted to reserve the righ: to 
mine the ground; he would guarantee to keep 
support on a portion of the ground; at the second 
conversation, at his request, we outlined on the 
blue print the R. A., and I told him that was the 
place we wanted to construct our first buildings. 
The understanding was that Hays would have the 
right to mine the surface, so long as it did not 
endanger the buildings or improvements on the 
R. A." 
50 Placing this construction upon the language 
of the reservation and proviso, necessarily requires 
a determination of the further question, is the 
52 
reservation so repugnant to the grant of the fee, 
as to render it void? I think not. 
Of course it follows from these views, that 
the ores, if any, removed in constructing the houses 
on the R. A., belong to plaintiffs, and that the 
defendant is not entitled to the support of the 
north dump, for the support of the concrete wall 
that was constructed off the R. A., and the plain-
tiffs are entitled to remove the ores, if any, in 
both dumps, by cutting the cribbing, so far as 
actually necessary, for that purpose. In mining 
and removing the ores, in accordance with this 
decision, plaintiffs, of course, must not wantonly, 
or unnecessarily injure or destroy the buildings 
or improvements placed on the ground by the de-
fendant. It follows that where the defendant, act-
ing under a mistaken view of the law, has erected 
buildings, or made improvements, outside the R. A., 
such fact cannot prevent the plaintiffs from min-
ing and removing the ore, according to the right 
reserved in the deed. The lessees having con-
tracted not to injure or destroy any buildings or 
improvements then (at the date of the lease) on 
any portion of the entire tract, the defendant, Utah 
Copper, can avail itself of that provision, as 
against the lessees with reference to any houses 
constructed outside the R. A., at the date of the 
execution of the lease. 
Plaintiffs are entitled to a permanent injunc-
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tion, in harmony with this decision, and the find-
ings and decree may be prepared accordingly. 
Sept. 4, 1917. 
GEO. F. GOODWIN, Judge. 
Attest: 
THOS. HOMER, Clerk. 
By J. P. FANNING, Deputy Clerk. 
[TITLE OF COURT AND CAUSE.] 
NOTICE. 
51 Filed Nov. 9, 1917. 
To the defendants above named, and to Messrs. 
Ellis & Lucas, their attorneys: 
YOU AND EACH OF YOU WILL PLEASE 
TAKE NOTICE, that on Monday, the 8th day of 
October, A. D. 1917, at the hour of 10 o'clock 
a. m. of said day, or as soon thereafter as counsel 
can be heard, the plaintiffs herein and the im-
pleaded defendant, Stephen Hays, will present to 
his Honor, Judge Geo. F. Goodwin, one of the 
judges of the above entitled court for settlement 
and signing, their proposed findings of fact and 
conclusions of law and decree herein, copy of 
which is herewith served upon you. 
WILLARD HANSON, 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs. 
BOOTH, LEE, BADGER & RICH, 
Attorneys for Stephen Hays, 
Impleaded Defendant. 
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Copy of the above notice, together with a copy 
of the hereunto attached findings of fact and con-
clusions of law and decree, received, and service 
thereof accepted this 5th day of October, 1917, 
at the hour of 3:45 o'clock p. m. 
DICKSON, ELLIS & LUCAS, 
Attorneys for Defendants. 
[TITLE OF COURT AND CAUSE.] 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW. 
52 This cause being at issue upon the amended 
complaint of the plaintiffs herein, also the answer 
of the impleaded defendant, Stephen Hays, joining 
with the plaintiffs in said action against the other 
defendants, and the answer of the defendants, Utah 
Copper Company, John Knudson and George C. Earl, 
to the amended complaint of the plaintiffs herein, 
and to the answer of the impleaded defendant, 
Stephen Hays, and having come on regularly for 
trial before said court, on the 28th day of June, 
1917; the plaintiffs appearing by Willard Hanson, 
Esq., their attorney, and the impleaded defendant 
Stephen Hays appearing by Messrs. Booth, Lee, 
Badger & Rich, his attorneys, and the defendants, 
Utah Copper Company, John Knudson and George 
C. Earl, appearing by Messrs. Ellis & Lucas, their 
attorneys, and the court having heard the evidence 
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adduced by the respective parties, and the argument 
of counsel, and being fully advised in the premises, 
53 does now make and file its findings of fact 
and conclusions of law herein, as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT. 
1. That on the lOth day of August, 1915, the 
defendant Stephen Hays was, and for a long time 
prior thereto had been, the owner, in possession 
and entitled to the possession of the property 
situate in the West Mountain Mining District, 
County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, consisting of 
approximately 3.45 acres, described as follows, 
to wit: 
Beginning at the S. W. corner of the west half 
of the east half of the N. W. quarter of Section 26, 
T. 3 S., Range 3 W., S. L. B. and M., thence S. 89 
degrees 55 min. E. 244 feet, thence N. 5 degrees E. 
306 feet, thence N. 63 degrees 26 min. W., 59 feet, 
thence N. 23 degrees 7 min. E. 74.9 feet, thence 
S. 63 degrees 26 min. E. 27 feet, thence N. 25 de-
grees 4 min. E. 61.4 feet, thence S. 63 degrees 
26 min. E. 21.5 feet, thence N. 29 degrees 45 
min. E. 162.5 feet, thence N. 2 degrees 45 min. 
W. 70 feet, thence N. 43 degrees 15 min. W. 55 feet, 
thence S. 57 degrees 39 min. W. 57.5 feet, thence N. 
49 degrees 15 min. W. 40 feet, more or less to the 
easterly corner of Lot 59, Smith Survey, of the 
town of Bingham on Valentine Scrip Entry, thence 
S. 41 degrees 48 min. W. along the southerly side 
line of Lots 59, 60 and 61 of said Smith Survey, 
W. along the southerly side line of said Lot 62 
of said Smith Survey, thence S. 27 degrees 55 min. 
W. along the southerly side line of said Lots 62 
94 feet to the corner of Lot 63, Smith Survey, 
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thence S. 19 degrees 6 min. W. 64 feet, thence S. 
34 degrees 14 min. W. along the southerly side 
line of Lots 63 and 64, Smith Survey 101 feet to the 
northeasterly side line of Lot 65 of Smith Survey, 
thence S. 49 degrees 15 min. E .. hi feet to the S. E. 
corner of said Lot 65, said lot being identical with 
Lot 5, Block 3, Plat "D," Wilkes Official Survey of 
Bingham, thence S. 50 degrees 25 min. W. 50 feet, 
thence S. 40 degrees 40 min. E. 8 feet, thence S. 44 
degrees 25 min. W. 18 feet, thence S. 46 degrees 
30 min. E 10.5 feet, thence S. 48 degrees 5 min. W. 
25 feet to the west side line of the west half of the 
east half of the N. W. quarter of said Section 26 ; 
thence south 0 degrees 5 min. W. along said line 244 
feet more or less to the place of beginning, con-
taining 3.45 acres more or less. 
2. That on said lOth day of August, 1915, 
said defendant Stephen Hays, together with his 
wife, by quit-claim deed conveyed to the defendant 
George C. Earl said property and premises above 
described, subject to the following reservations 
and provisions: That in and by said deed of con-
veyance said grantors expressly reserved to them-
selves, their heirs and assigns, the right to all 
54 ores in and underneath the surface area of 
the property so conveyed, together with the right 
to mine and remove the same, with the proviso that 
the mining operations should not endanger any 
building or buildings or improvements then or 
thereafter erected on the following described por-
tion of the surface area of said property so con-
veyed, by reason of sinking or caving of the sur-
face of said area caused by such mining operations, 
to wit: 
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Beginning at a point which bears N. 22 degrees 
30 min. E. 269 feet from the S. W. corner of the 
West half of the East half of the N. W. quarter of 
said Section 26; thence N. 17 degrees 30 min. E. 236 
feet; thence S. 72 degrees 30 min. E. 100 feet; 
thence S. 17 degrees 30 min. W. 236 feet; thence 
N. 72 degrees 30 min. W. 100 feet to the place of 
beginning. 
That said grantors in and by said deed also re-
served the right to use any wagon road which 
might be constructed in the future by said grantee 
over said property so conveyed. 
3. That the grantee in said deed, the de-
fendant George C. Earl, in obtaining and taking 
said deed was acting as the agent for and on 
behalf of the defendant Utah Copper Company, and 
thereafter and on said lOth day of August, 1915, 
conveyed said property to the defendant Utah 
Copper Company. 
4. That at the time of the conveyance by the 
defendant Stephen Hays to the defendant George 
C. Earl, and for a long time prior thereto the said 
premises conveyed as aforesaid were known to b~>. 
valuable for the ores and metals therein con-
tained, and particularly for copper ore; also known 
that ore of marketable and economic value had 
been found and was contained at many places in 
said premises so conveyed at and immediately 
underneath the surface area thereof; also known 
that mining operations had theretofore been car-
ried on in said premises by employing surface. 
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as well as underground, methods of mmmg; also 
known at the time said deed was made, that in 
the vicinity of said premises so conveyed the 
55 methods generally adopted for mining low grade 
copper ore were by taking out and removing all the 
material from the surface downward and shipping 
whatever thereof would justify shipping for the 
mineral contents therein contained. That said 
surface process of mining ore was, at the time of 
the making of said deed, carried on successfully 
by the defendant Utah Copper Company at its 
mine in said mining district in close proximity 
to the premises conveyed by the defendant Stephen 
Hays to the defendant George C. Earl. That said 
surface method of mining was and is the practical 
and more economic method, and the only method 
by which the mining of ores such as exist at or 
immediately underneath the surface of the ground 
conveyed by Stephen Hays to George C. Earl can 
be successfully and profitably carried on. 
5. That at the time said defendant Stephen 
Hays conveyed said premises to the defendant 
George C. Earl, it was the intention of the parties 
to said deed in respect to said reservation therein 
contained, that by said reservation the grantee 
therein, the defendant George C. Earl, thereby re-
linquished and waived any right whatsoever to 
sub-jacent support of the surface of said premises 
so conveyed in respect to any mining operations 
thereafter carried on by the grantor, said defend-
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ant Stephen Hays, his heirs and assigns, except 
only in respect to said portion thereof, being said 
rectangular strip of ground 236 feet in length by 
100 feet in width hereinbefore described, and in-
cluded within the area conveyed as aforesaid. 
6. That after the making of said conveyances, 
the defendant Utah Copper Company, excavated 
said rectangular strip aforesaid for the purpose 
of erecting buildings thereon and removed the ma-
terial so excavated to other portions of said prem-
ises so conveyed, making two dumps and supported 
the same in part by cribbing, and used a portion 
of one dump to support a retaining wall constructed 
by it. That the quantity of material so removed 
W'.as very great. That said material had economic 
56 and commercial value for the minerals therein 
contained, particularly copper. That when said 
rectangular strip had been excavated, the defend-
ant, Utah Copper Company, erected thereon a re-
taining wall and constructed five substantial houses 
in a row, three of them being situate wholly with-
in the boundaries of said rectangular strip, one 
partly within and partly without said strip, and one 
entirely off of said strip, and also continued said 
retaining wall on said premises so conveyed beyond 
the boundaries of said rectangular strip or building 
area. 
7. That after said rectangular strip had been 
excavated and built upon by the defendant Utah 
Copper Company, and on the 25th day of January, 
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1916, the defendant Stephen Hays, by an instru-
ment in writing, granted, demised and let to the 
plaintiffs herein for a term of two years from 
said date, that certain mine and mining property, 
including all the premises, conveyed by the said 
Stephen Hays to the said George C. Earl, upon 
the condition that in mining said premises the 
said lessees should not endanger any buildings on 
said premises or improvements thereon, and should 
in all respects abide by and conform to the re-
strictions upon said mine contained in said deed 
from said Stephen Hays to said George C. Earl. 
That in and by said lease said leasers, the plain-
tiffs herein, agreed among other things, to com-
mence work upon said mine, working the afore-
said premises steadily and continuously from the 
date of said lease, and to pay and deliver to said 
defendant Stephen Hays, lessor, as royalty twenty 
per cent of the net value of all ores extracted from 
said premises during the life of said lease. 
8. That immediately after the making and 
execution of said lease, the plaintiffs herein pre-
pared for and undertook to carry on the business of 
mining in and underneath the surface of said 
demised premises, except only as to the portion 
thereof referred to herein as the rectangular strip 
57 or building area, and the other portions thereof 
upon which buildings had been erected at the time 
of the making of said lease. That in so doing 
they attempted to first remove, ship and sell the 
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ore contained in the material which had been re-
moved by the defendant Utah Copper Company 
from said rectangular strip or building area and 
deposited in dumps or other portions of said 
premises. That the dumps were supported by 
cribbing erected by the defendant Utah Copper 
Company. That it became necessary for plaintiffs 
to disturb such cribbing sufficiently to enable them 
to economically and properly remove the ore con-
tained in said dumps. That while plaintiffs were 
so engaged and during the month of February, 
1916, the defendants Utah Copper Company, John 
Knudson and George C. Earl, without the consent 
of the plaintiffs, wrongfully broke down, destroyed 
and removed chutes and other property which the 
plaintiffs had constructed for the purpose of facili-
tating the mining operations to be carried on at 
said demised premises, and refused to permit the 
plaintiffs to remove any of the ore from said de-
mised premises or to disturb said cribbing, or to 
carry on any mining operations on said premises, 
and asserted and claimed that the plaintiffs had 
no right to mine or remove any ore from said 
premises or any part thereof, or from said dumps. 
9. That after the making of said lease to the 
plaintiffs and after the commencement of this 
action, the defendant Utah Copper Company erected, 
off of and to the south of said rectangular strip or 
building area and upon the premises included in 
said deed to said defendant George C. Earl and in 
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said lease to said plaintiffs, a large and expensive 
building. That in close proximity to the surface 
area immediately underneath said building so 
erected there was and is ore and mineral in large 
quantities and of commercial value which could be 
mined and shipped at a profit. 
10. That since the commencement of this ac-
58 tion, and during the pendency thereof, the plain-
tiffs herein have respectively sold, transferred and 
assigned their interest in said lease, and the same 
is now held by Earl Randall, Trustee in trust for 
J. W. Rooklidge, C. H. Thompson, D. A. Bunker 
and himself, who are now the legal and equit-
able owners of said lease. 
11. That the impleaded defendant, Stephen 
Hays, is now and ever since prior to the making 
of said deed and of said lease has been, the owner 
of all the ores and minerals in and underneath the 
surface area of the property and premises conveyed 
by him to the defendant George C. Earl, and has 
not sold nor conveyed his said estate, right, title 
or interest therein or thereto, or otherwise dis-
posed of the same, except under said lease to the 
plaintiffs herein. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW. 
1. That the impleaded defendant Stephen 
Hays is the owner of all the ores in and under-
neath the surface area of the property described 
in the findings of fact herein, conveyed by him 
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to the defendant George C. Earl, and by said 
George C. Earl conveyed to the defendant Utah 
Copper Company, together with the right to mine 
and remove all the ores therefrom, providing that 
the mining operations shall not endanger any build-
ing or buildings or improvements erected or to be 
erected on the portion of the surface area of said 
property so conveyed, being the rectangular strip 
236 feet in length by 100 feet in width described 
in the findings of fact herein; and provided further, 
that in carrying on said mining operations, neither 
plaintiffs nor said Stephen Hays, shall wantonly 
or unnecessarily injure or damage any buildings or 
improvements erected on said premises by the de-
fendant, Utah Copper Company. 
2. That in and by the reservation contained 
in said deed of conveyance from the defendant 
Stephen Hays to the defendant George C. Earl of 
the premises described in the findings of fact 
herein, and with respect to and concerning the 
59 mining and removing by the grantor, said defend-
ant Stephen Hays, his heirs and assigns, of any 
and all ores in and underneath the surface area 
of said property so conveyed, except only as to a 
portion thereof, to wit, the rectangular strip 236 
feet in length by 100 feet in width described in 
the findings of fact, the said grantee, the defendant 
George C. Earl, waived or released and surrender~d 
all right to surface and sub-jacent support of the 
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ground so conveyed to him in its natural state, or 
otherwise. 
3. That during the continuance of the lease 
referred to in the findings of fact herein, the 
plaintiffs herein, and their successors in interest 
under said lease, have the right (except as herein-
after qualified) to mine and remove any and all 
ores in and underneath the surface area of the prop-
erty conveyed by said defendant Stephen Hays to 
said defendant George C. Earl and described in the 
findings of fact herein, including all the dumps 
thereon made by the defendant Utah Copper Com-
pany from material excavated from said premises, 
regardless of whether used to support or brace a 
retaining wall, and in so doing can, in the exercise 
of reasonable care and caution, disturb the cribbing 
erected by the defendant Utah Copper Company to 
support said dumps in so far as it may be rea-
sonably necessary to facilitate the mining and re-
moving of the ore and mineral contained in said 
dumps or contained in and underneath the sur-
face area of the property described in the findings 
of fact herein. 
4. That in carrying on mining operations un-
der said lease the plaintiffs. herein, or their succes-
sors in interest, are not tO endanger any buildings 
or improvements erected or that may hereafter 
be erected on said retangular strip of land within 
the area of the property so leased (the same being 
the strip of land 236 feet in length by 100 feet in 
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width, specifically described in the findings of fact 
herein) by reason of the sinking or caving of the 
surface of said area caused by their mining opera-
tions, nor endanger the surface support of any 
other buildings or improvements upon any portion 
60 of said property so leased which were situate 
thereon at the time of the making of said lease, 
to wit, on the 26th day of January, 1916. 
5. That the defendant Utah Copper Company 
IS not entitled to surface or sub-jacent support for 
any buildings or improvements of any kind which 
it has erected upon said premises conveyed by said 
Stephen Hays to George C. Earl outside of said 
area herein referred to as the rectangular strip, 
when by protecting such buildings and improve-
ments with surface support would deprive and pre-
vent said Stephen Hays from mining and removing 
ores and minerals of commercial value from under-
neath such buildings and improvements. 
6. That the defendant Utah Copper Company 
is not entitled to surface or sub-jacent support for 
any building or improvements of any kind erected 
upon said premises (not included in the area of said 
rectangular strip) since the date of said lease from 
Stephen Hays to the plaintiffs, to wit, the 26th 
day of January, 1916, when by protecting such 
buildings and improvements with surface support 
therefor would prevent the plaintiffs and their 
successors in interest under said lease from min-
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ing and removing ores and minerals of commercial 
value from underneath any buildings and improve-
ments so erected since the date of said lease. 
7. That the plaintiffs and the defendant 
Stephen Hays are entitled to a permanent injunc-
tion enjoining and restraining the defendant Utah 
Copper Company, and its agents, servants and 
employes, and all persons acting under it or them, 
from in any manner interfering with or molesting 
the plaintiffs, or their successors in interest in said 
lease, from mining and removing the ores and 
minerals in and underneath the surface of said 
demised premises, including the ores contained in 
the dumps made by said defendant Utah Copper 
Company from material excavated and taken from 
said rectangular strip, except in so far as the 
61 mining of ore (other than the ore contained in 
said dumps) will endanger, by sinking or caving 
of the surface area, any buildings or improvements 
erected or hereafter erected upon the said rectan-
gular strip hereinbefore described, or any other 
buildings or improvements that were erected upon 
said premises outside of said rectangular strip prior 
to January 26th, 1916, the date of said lease. 
8. Let judgment be entered accordingly against 
the defendant Utah Copper Company and in favor 
of the plaintiffs herein and the defendant Stephen 
Hays, with costs to plaintiffs. 
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Dated this 8th day of November, A. D. 1917. 
By the court, 
GEO. F. GOODWIN, Judge. 
Attest: 
THOS. HOMER, Clerk. 
By B. F. QUINN, 
Deputy Clerk. 
(Seal). 
62 [TITLE OF COURT AND CAUSE.] 
DECREE. 
This cause having been at issue and having 
come on for trial before said court on the 28th 
day of June, 1917, and after hearing the evidence 
adduced by the respective parties and the argument 
of counsel, and being fully advised in the premises, 
the court has made Findings of Fact and Conclu-
sions of Law herein. 
NOW THEREFORE, upon the Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law, and the evidence 
adduced upon said trial, and on motion of Willard 
Hanson, Esq., attorney for the plaintiffs herein, 
and Messrs. Booth, Lee, Badger & Rich, attorneys 
for the defendant, Stephen Hays, impleaded herein. 
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DE-
CREED, as follows: 
1. That the defendant Stephen Hays is the 
63 owner of all the ores in and underneath the sur-
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face area of the following described premises sit-
uate in the West Mountain Mining District, County 
of Salt Lake, State of Utah, to wit: 
Beginning at the S. W. corner of the west half 
of the east half of the N. W. quarter of Section 26, 
T. 3 S., Range 3 W., S. L. B. and M., thence S. 89 
degrees 55 min. E. 244 feet, thence N. 5 degrees E. 
306 feet, thence N. 63 degrees 26 min. W., 59 feet, 
thence N. 23 degrees 7 min. E. 74.9 feet, thence S. 63 
degrees 26 min. E. 27 feet; thence N. 25 degrees 
4 min E. 61.4 feet; thence S. 63 degrees 26 min. 
E. 21.5 feet, thence N. 29 degrees 45 min. E. 
162.5 feet, thence N. 2 degrees 45 min. W. 70 
feet, thence N. 43 degrees 15 min. W. 55 feet, 
thence S. 57 degrees 39 min. W. 57.5 feet, thence N. 
49 degrees 15 min. W. 40 feet, more or less to the 
easterly corner of Lot 59, Smith Survey, of the 
town of Bingham on Valentine Scrip Entry, thence 
S. 41 degrees 48 min. W. along the southerly side 
line of Lots 59, 60 and 61 of said Smith Survey, 
170 feet more or less to the easterly corner of Lot 62 
of said Smith Survey, thence S. 27 degrees 55 min. 
W. along the southerly side line of said Lot 62 
94 feet to the corner of Lot 63, Smith Survey, 
thence S. 19 degrees 6 min. W. 64 feet, thence S. 
34 degrees 14 min. W. along the southerly side 
line of Lots 63 and 64, Smith Survey 101 feet to the 
northeasterly side line o{ Lot 65 of Smith Survey, 
thence S. 49 degrees 15 min. E., 16 feet to the S. E. 
corner of said Lot 65, said lot being identical with 
Lot 5, Block 3, Plat "D," Wilkes Official Survey of 
Bingham, thence S. 50 degrees 25 min. W. 50 feet, 
thence S. 40 degrees 40 min. E. 8 feet, thence S. 44 
degrees 25 min. W. 18 feet, thence S. 46 degrees 
30 min. E., 10.5 feet thence S. 48 degrees 5 min. W. 
25 feet to the west side line of the west half of the 
east half of the N. W. quarter of said Section 26; 
thence south 0 degrees 5 min. W. along said side line 
244 feet more or less to the place of beginning, con-
taining 3.45 acres more or less. 
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together with the right to mine and remove such 
ores without supporting the surface in its natural 
state or otherwise, except only as to the following 
rectangular strip being a part or portion of said 
premises, to wit: 
Beginning at a point which bears N. 22 degrees 
30 min. E. 269 feet from the S. W. corner of the 
West half of East half of N. W. quarter of said 
Section 26; thence N. 17 degrees 30 min. E. 236 
feet; thence S. 72 degrees 30 min. E. 100 feet; 
thence S. 17 degrees 30 min. W. 236 feet; thence 
N. 72 degrees 30 min. W. 100 feet to beginning. 
In respect to which said strip or portion no mining 
operations shall endanger any building or buildings 
or improvements erected or to be erected thereon, 
by reason of the sinking or caving of the surface 
of said area caused by mining operations, and pro-
vided that in carrying on said mining operations, 
neither plaintiffs nor said Stephen Hays, shall 
wantonly or unnecessarily injure or damage any 
buildings or improvements erected on said premises 
by the defendant, Utah Copper Company. 
2. That the plaintiffs herein, as lessees of said 
64 defendant Stephen Hays, and their successors in 
interest under said lease, have, during the continu-
ance of said lease, the lawful right to mine and re-
move any and all ores in and underneath the sur-
face area of all of said premises first hereinbefore 
described, including the ores contained in the dumps 
thereon, without supporting the surface or any 
part thereof in its natural state or otherwise, ex-
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cept in respect to the portion thereof hereinbefore 
described and referred to as a rectangular strip 236 
feet in length by 100 feet in width, in respect to 
which said strip or portion the plaintiffs herein, 
and their successors in interest, are not to endanger 
any buildings or improvements erected or that may 
hereafter be erected thereon, by reason of the 
sinking or caving of the surface of said area 
caused by their mining operations, nor endanger the 
surface support of any other buildings or improve-
ments which were situate on any other portion of 
said premises at the time of the making of said 
lease, to wit, on the 26th day of January, 1916. 
3. That the defendant Utah Copper Company, 
and its servants, agents and employes, and all per-
sons acting under it or them, are hereby per-
manently enjoined and restrained from in any 
manner interfering with or molesting the plaintiffs, 
or their successors in interest under said lease, 
from mining and removing the ores and minerals in 
and underneath said premises hereinbefore described, 
including the ores contained in the dumps made by 
said defendant Utah Copper Company from material 
excavated and taken from said rectangular strip, 
except in so far as the mining of ore (other than 
the ore contained in said dumps) will endanger, by 
sinking or caving of the surface area, any buildings 
or improvements erected or hereafter erected upon 
the said rectangular strip hereinbefore described, 
or any other buildings or improvements that were 
le 
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erected upon said premises outside of said rectan-
65 gular strip prior to January 26th, 1916, the date of 
said lease. 
4. That the plaintiffs have and recover from 
the defendant Utah Copper Company their costs 
and disbursements herein, taxed ~at the sum of 
$ .............. . 
Dated this 8th day of November, A. D. 1917. 
By the court, 
GEO. F. GOODWIN, Judge. 
Attest: 
THOS. HOMER, Clerk. 
By H. C. McDONOUGH, 
Deputy Clerk. 
(Seal.) 
[TITLE OF COURT AND CAUSE.] 
OBJECTIONS OF THE DEFENDANT UTAH 
COPPER COMPANY TO FINDINGS OF 
FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DE-
CREE AS PROPOSED BY THE PLAINTIFF 
HEREIN. 
66 Filed Nov. 9, 1917. 
I. 
Defendant objects to all of the proposed find-
ing of fact No. 2 after the first sentence therein, 
and submit that the period after the phrase "subject 
~:- to the following reservations and provisions," should 
! 
be changed to a colon, and that then should follov, 
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the language of the reservations in the exact lan-
guage of the deed, to wit: 
"Said grantors hereby reserve to themselves, 
their heirs, successors and assigns, the right to all 
ores in and underneath the surface area hereinbefore 
described, together with the right to mine and re-
move same, provided said mining operations of said 
grantors shall not endanger any building or build-
ings or improvements now or hereafter erected on a 
portion of the surface area hereinabove described 
by reason of sinking or caving of the surface of 
said area caused by said mining operations, said 
portion being described as follows, to wit: 
Beginning at a point which bears N. 22 degrees 
30 min. E. 269 feet from the S. W. corner of the 
West half of East half of the N. W. quarter of said 
Section 26; thence N. 17 degrees 30 min. E. 236 
feet; thence S. 72 degrees 30 min. E. 100 feet; 
thence S. 17 degrees 30 min. W. 236 feet; thence 
N. 72 degrees 30 min. W. 100 feet to beginning. 
Said grantors also reserve the right to use any 
wagon road which may be constructed in the future 
by said grantees over the 3.45 acres of ground first-
ly described herein." 
67 And defendant objects to this second finding 
as now proposed by plaintiff because it does not ac-
curately and truly state the reservations and pro-
visions of said deed. 
II. 
Defendant objects to the proposed finding of 
fact No. 4 for the reason that there is no evidence 
to support the same and it is contrary to the mani-
fest weight of the evedince in this case and con-
trary to the uncontradicted evidence in this case 
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in so far as it finds that the premises were known 
to be valuable for ores and particularly copper ore, 
as the evidence was that the ore therein was not 
commercially workable except when the market 
price of copper was above twenty-two cents a pound, 
and that at the time of the conveyances in question 
the then market price of copper was only about 
seventeen cents a pound. 
Defendant further objects to said finding No. 4 
because there is no evidence that the method gen-
erally adopted for mining low grade ore was by 
surface mining as proposed. 
Defendant further objects specifically to that 
part of the proposed finding that surface mining 
is carried on by the defendant, Utah Copper Com-
pany, at its mine in said district, as carrying a 
false inference that all of the mining in said dis-
trict was done by surface mining, whereas the 
evidence showed that some of the mining of the 
defendant company and other companies was also 
carried on by underground mining. 
Defendant also- objects to that portion of the 
proposed finding in substance to the effect that 
the surface method is the only method by which 
such ores can be successfully and profitably mined, 
as the evidence showed that while that was the 
more economical method, it did not show that it was 
68 the only method or that it could not be successfully 
mined by underground method, and on the con-
trary the evidence showed that much of the ore in 
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that ground had been taken out by and through the 
working of tunnels. 
III. 
Defendant objects to the proposed finding No. 
5 as being without any evidence to support the same 
and contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence 
and contrary to the uncontradicted evidence in the 
case, and because said finding fails to distinguish 
or differentiate between sub-jacent support of the 
ground in its natural state and sub-jacent support 
for buildings and structures thereon. 
IV. 
Defendant objects to proposed finding No. 6 
because it does not show that the excavation there-
in mentioned was done for the purpose of construct-
ing and erecting the buildings or houses therein 
mentioned. 
v. 
Defendant objects to proposed finding No. 7 
because it omits material portions of the lease in 
question, and said lease should be set forth in full 
in such finding, particularly the provisions thereof 
characterizing the premises as a mine and providing 
for the timbering of the same and for the extraction 
of ore and for the right to use roads on the land. 
VI. 
Defendant objects. to proposed finding No. 8 in 
so far as it recites in substance that the defendant 
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company and John Knudson and George C. Earl 
wrongfully destroyed or removed the chutes, etc., as 
69 there was absolutely no evidence whatsoever to 
support that finding and on the contrary by reason 
of the absence of evidence with respect thereto, this 
action was dismissed as to the said John Knudson 
and George C. Earl. 
VII. 
Defendant objects to the proposed finding of 
fact No. 9, in so far as it purports to find that there 
was ore in large quantities and of commercial 
value, etc., underneath the building therein referred 
to, as the only evidence was that there was ore in 
a ledge or bluff between said building and the ad-
joining restricted or rectangular area. 
VIII. 
Defendant objects to proposed finding No. 10 
for the reason that there is no evidence whatsoever 
to show who were the assignees of the plaintiffs, 
lessees, or who are now the legal and equitable 
owners of the lease. 
IX. 
Defendant objects to proposed finding No. 11 
as contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence 
in this case and contrary to the documentary evi-
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dence in the case and as being without any evidence 
in the record to support the same. 
X. 
Defendant objects to conclusion of law No. 1, 
in so far as it finds the ownership of the ores there-
in mentioned in the defendant, Stephen Hays, etc., 
on the ground that there is no evidence to support 
the same and is contrary to the manifest weight of 
the evidence in the case and contrary to the uncon-
tradicted evidence in the case, and is contrary to 
70 law. 
XI. 
Defendant objects to proposed conclusion of 
law No. 2 as being without evidence to support tht> 
same and contrary to the manifest weight of the 
evidence in the case and contrary to law and as 
failing to distinguish a"nd differentiate between the 
right of sub-jacent support of the ground in its 
natural state and sub-jacent support for buildings 
and structures thereon. 
XII. 
Defendant objects to the proposed conclusion of 
law No. 3 on the ground that there is no evidence to 
justify the same and that the same is contrary to 
the manifest weight of the evidence in the case and 
contrary to law. 
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XIII. 
Defendant makes the same objection to the 
proposed conclusion of law No. 4. 
XIV. 
Defendant objects to the proposed conclusion of 
law No. 5, in thart it does not give to the defendant 
the right of sub-jacent support for the soil in its 
natural state and also on the ground that the same 
is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence 
and is without any evidence to support the same 
and is contrary to law, and upon the further ground 
that this honorable court specifically ruled in its 
decision that the plaintiffs could not wantonly inter-
fere with any such building and they could only do 
so to the extent reasonably necessary to exercise 
the rights given them by the court's decision. 
XV. 
71 And defendant makes the same objection to 
proposed conclusion of law No. 6. 
XVI. 
Defendant also makes the same objection to pro-
posed conclusion of law No. 7. 
XVII. 
Defendant also makes the same objection to 
proposed conclusion of law No. 8. 
78 
XVIII. 
Defendant makes the same objections to the 
decree proposed by the plaintiffs as it did to the 
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law 
with respect to the matters thereby covered. 
Dated this 9th day of October, 1917. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DICKSON, ELLIS & LUCAS, 
Attorneys for Defendant, 
Utah Copper Company. 
Received copy of the above this 9th day of 
October, 1917. 
WILLARD HANSON, 
SHIRLEY P. JONES, 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs. 
[TITLE OF COURT AND CAUSE.] 
NOTI.CE. 
73 F1iled Nov. 23, 1917. 
To the above named defendant, Utah Copper 
Company, and to Dickson, Ellis & Lucas, it's attor~ 
neys: 
You and each of you will please take notice thut 
his Honor, Judge George F. Goodwin, the trial Judge 
of the above entitled court on the 8th day of Novem~ 
ber, A. D. 1917, duly made and entered Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree in the above 
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entitled cause and the same were duly filed on the 
9th day of November, A. D. 1917, and a copy of 
said Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and De-
cree so made and entered and filed as aforesaid is 
herewith served upon you. 
WILLARD HANSON, 
SHIRLEY P. JONES and 
D. B. KIMBALL, 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs. 
BOOTH, LEE, BADGER & RICH, 
Attorneys for impleaded de-
fendant, Stephen Hays, 
Copy of the above notice together with Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree received 
this 23rd day of November, 1917. 
DICKSON, ELLIS & LUCAS, 
Attorneys for defendant, 
Utah Copper Company. 
l TITLE OF COURT AND CAUSE.] 
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL. 
74 Filed Nov. 28, 1917. 
Comes now the above named defendant, the 
Utah Copper Company, by Dickson, Ellis & Lucas, 
its attorneys, and moves the court to vacate and 
set aside the findings of fact and the conclusions 
of law and the decree heretofore made herein on 
the 8th day of November, 1917, and heretofore filed 
herein on the 9th day of November, 1917, and to 
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grant to this defendant a new trial of this action, 
upon the following grounds and for the following 
reasons and each of them which materially affect 
the substantial rights of this defendant, to wit: 
1. Because on the trial of this action the 
court erred in overruling the petition and motion 
of this defendant to remove this cause to the 
United States District Court for the District of 
Utah. 
75 2. Because the court erred in overruling 
the motion of this defendant to dismiss this 
action. 
3. Because of errors in law occurring during 
the trial and excepted to by this defendant at the 
time. 
4. Because said findings of fact are contrary 
to and against the law. 
5. Because said findings of fact are not 
sustained by sufficient evidence. 
6. Because the evidence in this cause is in-
sufficient to justify the said findings of fact. 
7. Because said findings of fact are contrary 
to law and to the evidence. 
8. Because said conclusions of law are con-
trary to and against the law. 
9. Because said conclusions of law are not 
sustained by any sufficient evidence in this cause 
and because they are contrary to the law and to 
the evidence. 
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10. Because said decree is contrary to and 
against the law. 
11. Because said decree is not sustained by 
sufficient evidence and is contrary to the law and 
to the evidence in this cause. 
12. Because of errors in law occurring at the 
trial and excepted to by this defendant at the time 
in the rejection of evidence offered by this de-
fendant . 
.., 
13. Because of errors in law occurring at the 
time and excepted to by this defendant at the 
time, in that the court refused on the trial to admit 
proper and material evidence offered by this de-
fendant and which was illegally withheld against 
the demand of this defendant. 
76 14. Because of errors of law occurring at 
the trial and excepted to by this defendant at 
the time in that the court admitted on the trial 
improper evidence on the part of the plaintiff over 
the objection and exception of this defendant. 
15. Because of errors in law occurring at the 
trial and excepted to by this defendant at the time 
in that the court admitted on the trial improper 
evidence on the part of Stephen Hays, the im-
pleaded defendant, over the objection and excep-
tion of this defendant. 
16. Because the court's finding of fact num-
bered 1 is contrary to and against the law and is 
not sustained by sufficient evidence and is con-
trary to law and to the evidence. 
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17. Because the court's finding of fact num-
bered 2 is contrary to and against the law and 
is not sustained by sufficient evidence and is 
contrary to the law and to the evidence. 
18. Because the court's finding numbered 3 
is contrary to and against the law and is not 
sustained by sufficient evidence and is contrary 
to law and to the evidence. 
19. Because the court's finding numbered 4 
is contrary to and against the law and is not 
sustained by sufficient evidence and is contrary 
to law and to the evidence. 
20. Because the court's finding numbered r 
is contrary to and against the law and is not sus-
tained by sufficient evidence and is contrary to 
law and to the evidence. 
21. Because the court's finding numbered 6 
is contrary to and against the law and is not 
sustained by sufficient evidence and is contrary 
to law and to the evidence. 
77 22. Because the court's finding of fact num-
bered 7 is contrary to and against the law and is 
not sustained by sufficient evidence and is con-
trary to law and to the evidence. 
23. Because the court's finding of fact num-
bered 8 is contrary to and against the law and is 
not sustained by sufficient evidence and is con-
trary to law and to the evidence. 
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24. Because the court's finding of fact num-
bered 9 is contrary to and against the law and is 
not sustained by sufficient evidence and is con-
trary to law and to the evidence. 
25. Because the court's finding of fact num-
bered 10 is contrary to and against the law and 
is not sustained by sufficient evidence and is con-
trary to law and to the evidence. 
26. Because the court's finding of fact num-
bered 11 is contrary to and against the law and is 
not sustained by sufficient evidence and is con-
trary to law and to the evidence. 
27. Because the court's conclusion of law 
numbered 1 is contrary to and against the law 
and is not sustained by sufficient evidence and is 
contrary to law and to the evidence. 
28. Because the court's conclusion of law 
numbered 2 is contrary to and against the law 
and is not sustained by sufficient evidence and is 
contrary to law and to the evidence. 
29. Because the court's conclusion of law 
numbered 3 is contrary to and against the law 
and is not sustained by sufficient evidence and is 
contrary to law and to the evidence. 
30. Because the court's conclusion of law 
numbered 4 is contrary to and against the law and 
is not sustained by sufficient evidence and is con-
trary to law and to the evidence. 
.84 
78 31. Because the court's conclusion of law num-
bered 5 is contrary to and against the law and is 
not sustained by sufficient evidence and is con-
trary to law and to the evidence. 
32. Because the court's conclusion of law 
numbered 6 is contrary to and against the law 
and is not sustained by sufficient evidence and is 
contrary to law and to the evidence. 
33. Because the court's conclusion of law 
numbered 7 is contrary to and against the law 
and is not sustained by sufficient evidence and is 
contrary to law and to the evidence. 
34. Because the court's conclusion of law 
numbered 8 is contrary to and against the law and 
is not sustained by sufficient evidence and is con-
trary to law and to the evidence. 
35. Because the court erred in entering the 
decree herein in favor of the plaintiff and against 
this defendant and because the court should have 
entered a decree herein in favor of this defendant 
and against the plaintiff. 
36. Because the court erred in entering the 
decree herein in favor of Stephen Hays, the im-
pleaded defendant, and against this defendant, and 
because the court should have entered a decree 
herein in favor of this defendant and against the 
said impleaded defendant. 
37. Because the first paragraph of said de-
cree is contrary to and against the law and is not 
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sustained by sufficient evidence and is contrary 
to law and to the evidence. 
38. Because the second paragraph of said 
decree is contrary to and against the law and is 
not sustained by sufficient evidence and is con-
trary to law and to the evidence. 
79 39. Because the third paragraph of said de-
cree is contrary to and against the law and is not 
sustained by sufficient evidence and is contrary to 
law and to the evidence. 
40. Because the fourth paragraph of said de-
cree is contrary to and against the law and is not 
sustained by sufficient evidence and is contrary 
to law and to the evidence. 
DICKSON, ELLIS & LUCAS, 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Utah Copper Company. 
Dated: November 28, 1917. 
Received copy of foregoing Motion for New 
Trial and due service admitted this 28th day of 
November, 1917. 
WILLARD HANSON, 
Attorney for Plaintiffs. 
Received copy of foregoing Motion for New 
Trial this 28th day of November, 1917. 
BOOTH, LEE, BADGER & RICH, 
Attorneys for Impleaded Defendant 
Stephen Hays. 
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[TITLE OF COURT AND CAUSE.] 
NOTICE. 
80 Filed Dec. 6, 1917. 
To the above named defendant, Utah Copper 
Company, a corporation, and to Dickson, Ellis- & 
Lucas, its attorneys: 
You and each of you will please take notice 
that on Saturday, the 15th day of December, A. D. 
1917, at the hour of 10 a. m., or as soon thereafter 
as counsel can be heard, plaintiff, and the im-
pleaded defendant, Stephen Hays, will call up for 
argument and disposition before Honorable George 
F. Goodwin, one of the judges of the above entitled 
court, defendant's motion for new trial herein. 
WILLARD HANSON, 
SHIRLEY P. JONES, 
Attorneys for Plaintiff. 
BOOTH, LEE, BADGER & RICH, 
Attorneys for Stephen Hays. 
Received copy of the foregoing notice this 5 
day of December, A. D. 1917. 
DICKSON, ELLIS & LUCAS, 
Attorneys for Defendant Utah 
Copper Company, a corporation. 
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[TITLE OF COURT AND CAUSE.] 
ENTERED ORDER. CASE NUMBER 21157. 
DATED DECEMBER 15, 1917. 
GOODWIN, JUDGE. 
GEO. F. 
81 Defendant's motion for new trial coming now 
on before the court to be heard, Willard Hanson 
appearing in behalf of plaintiff and Dickson, Ellis 
& Lucas appearing in behalf of defendant. Said 
motion is argued to the court by respective attor-
neys and the court having considered and being 
now fully advised in the premises, it is ordered 
that said motion be and the same is hereby denied. 
[TITLE OF COURT AND CAUSE.] 
NOTICE. 
82 Filed December 17, 1917. 
To the above named defendant, Utah Copper 
Company and to Dickson, Ellis & Lucas, its attor-
neys: 
You and each of you will please take notice 
that on December the 15th, A. D. 1917, in the 
above entitled court, defendant's motion for a new 
trial was overruled. 
WILLARD HANSON, 
SHffiLEY P. JONES, 
Attorneys for Plaintiff. 
BOOTH, LEE, BADGER & RICH, 
Attorneys for Stephen Hays, 
Impleaded Defendant. 
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Received copy of the foregoing notice this 15 
day of December, 1917. 
DICKSON, ELLIS & LUCAS, 
Attorneys for Defendant, Utah 
Copper Company. 
[TITLE OF COURT AND CAUSE.] 
NOTICE OF APPEAL. 
83 Filed May 25, 1918. 
To the Clerk of the Above Entitled Court, and to 
Messrs. Willard Hanson and Shirley P. Jones, 
Attorneys for Plaintiff, and to Messrs. Booth, 
Lee, Badger and Rich, Attorneys for Stephen 
Hays, Impleaded Defendant: 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the above-
named defendant, the Utah Copper Company, a 
corporation, hereby appeals to the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah from the judgment or d"cree 
of the above entitled District Court of the Third 
Judicial District, in and for Salt Lake CoLmty, 
State of Utah, entered herein in favor of the above 
named plaintiff and the above named impleaded de-
fendant and against the defendant above named, 
Utah Copper Company, under date of November 
8, 1917, and filed in the office of the clerk of the 
84 above entitled court on the 9th day of November, 
1917, granting to said plaintiff and impleaded 
defendant certain injunctive relief as therein set 
'• 
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forth, which said judgment or decree became final 
on the 15th day of December, 1917, by virtue of the 
entry herein on that day of an order overruling 
the motion of the defendant Utah Copper Company 
for a new trial in the above entitled cause. 
Dated this 24th day of May, 1918. 
DICKSON, ELLIS & LUCA~. 
L. F. ADAMSON, 
Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant. 
Received cop~ of the foregoing notice of appeal 
this 24th day of May, 1918. 
WILLARD HANSON, 
SHIRLEY P. JONES, 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Respondent. 
BOOTH, LEE, BADGER & RICH, 
Attorneys for Stephen Hays, Impleaded 
Defendant Respondent. 
[TITLE OF COURT AND CAUSE.] 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE. 
85 I, THOMAS HOMER, Clerk of the District 
Court of the Third Judicial District, in and for Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, do hereby certify 
that the above and foregoing and hereto attached 
files contain all the papers filed in this court in 
the case of F. L. BYRON, ET AL, vs. UTAH 
COPPER COMPANY, a corporation, ET AL, No. 
21157, the whole constituting the Judgment Roll. 
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I further certify that an undertaking on appeal 
in due form has been properly filed and that the 
same was filed on the 25th day of May, A. D. 1918. 
And I further certify that said Judgment Roll 
is by me transmitted to the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah pursuant to such appeal. 
WITNESS my hand and the Seal of said 
Court at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 21st day of 
June, A. D. 1918. 
THOS. HOMER, 
Clerk Third District Court, 
Salt Lake County, Utah. 
By HATTIE FINNIGAN, 
Deputy Clerk. 
[TITLE OF COURT AND CAUSE.] 
No. 3240. 
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR. 
Filed June 28, 1918. 
Comes now the Utah Copper Company, one 
of the above named defendants and in connection 
with and as a part of its appeal filed and taken 
herein, herewith makes the following assignments 
of error which it avers were committed in the 
entry and rendition of the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law and decree in this action and 
in the record and proceedings and rulings of the 
court had and made prior thereunto, to the grievous 
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prejudice of this defendant and appellant the 
Utah Copper Company, that is to say: 
1. That the court erred in making and enter-
ing its finding of fact herein numbered eleven, 
to the effect that the impleaded defendant Stephen 
Hays is now and ever since prior to the making 
of said deed and of said lease has been the owner 
of all the ores and minerals in and underneath 
the surface area of the property and premises 
conveyed by him to the defendant George C. Earl, 
and has not sold nor conveyed his said estate, 
right, title or interest therein or thereto or other-
wise disposed of the same except under said lease 
to the plaintiffs herein, for the reason that and 
because while the said finding is denominated by 
the court as a finding of fact, it is in truth and 
in reality a conclusion of law and is not supported 
by or justified by the other findings of fact made 
by the court herein, but on the contrary is incon-
sistent with and repugnant to and in conflict with 
and unsupported by and overthrown by the other 
findings of fact made by the court herein. 
2. The court erred in making and entering 
herein its conclusion of law numbered one for 
the reason that the same is not supported by the 
findings of fact herein but on the contrary is 
inconsistent with, in conflict with, repugnant to 
and unsupported by the findings of fact herein. 
3. The court erred in making and entering 
herein its conclusion of law numbered two for the 
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reason that the same is not supported by the 
findings of fact herein but on the contrary is 
inconsistent with, in conflict with, repugnant to 
and unsupported by the findings of fact herein. 
4. The court erred in making and entering 
herein its conclusion of law numbered three for 
the reason that the same is not supported by the 
findings of fact herein but on the contrary is 
inconsistent with, in conflict with, repugnant to and 
unsupported by the findings of fact herein. 
5. The court erred in making and entering 
herein its conclusion of law numbered four for 
the reason that the same is not supported by the 
findings of fact herein but on the contrary is 
inconsistent with, in conflict with, repugnant to 
and unsupported by the findings of fact herein. 
6. The court erred in making and entering 
herein its conclusion of law numbered five for the 
reason that the same is not supported by the find-
ings of fact herein but on the contrary is incon-
sistent with, in conflict with, repugnant to and 
unsupported by the findings of fact herein. 
7. The court erred in making and entering 
herein its conclusion of law numbered six for the 
reason that the same is not supported by the find-
ings of fact herein but on the contrary is incon-
sistent with, in conflict with, repugnant to and 
unsupported by the findings of fact herein. 
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8. The court erred in making and entering 
herein its conclusion of law numbered seven for 
the reason that the same is not supported by the 
findings of fact herein but on the contrary is 
inconsistent with, in conflict with, repugnant to 
and unsupported by the findings of fact herein. 
9. The court erred in making and entering 
herein its conclusion of law numbered eight for 
the reason that the same is not supported by the 
findings of fact herein but on the contrary is 
inconsistent with, in conflict with, repugnant to 
and unsupported by the findings of fact herein. 
10. Because the court erred in making and 
entering its decree herein in favor of the plain-
tiffs and the impleaded defendant against this 
defendant in that and because the said decree is 
not supported by and on the contrary is in con-
flict with, repugnant to, inconsistent with and un-
supported by the findings of fact herein. 
11. The court erred in making and entering 
herein the first paragraph of the decree made 
and entered herein in that and because the same 
is not supported by, but on the contrary is in 
conflict with, inconsistent with, repugnant to and 
unsupported by the findings of fact herein. 
12. The court erred in making and entering 
herein the second paragraph of the decree made 
and entered herein in that and because the same 
is not supported by, but on the contrary is in 
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conflict with, inconsistent with, repugnant to and 
unsupported by the findings of fact herein. 
13. The court erred in making and entering 
herein the third paragraph of the decree made 
and entered herein in that and because the same 
is not supported by, but on the contrary is in 
conflict with, inconsistent with, repugnant to and 
unsupported by the findings of fact herein. 
14. The court erred in making and entering 
herein the fourth paragraph of the decree made 
and entered herein in that and because the same 
is not supported by, but on the contrary is in 
conflict with, inconsistent with, repugnant to and 
unsupported by the findings of fact herein. 
15. The court erred in overruling the motion 
of this defendant for a new trial. 
16. The court erred in overruling the motion 
of this defendant for a new trial and particularly 
with respect to the eighth ground thereof. 
17. The court erred in overruling the motion 
of this defendant for a new trial and particularly 
with respect to the tenth ground thereof. 
18. The court erred in overruling the motion 
of this defendant for a new trial and particularly 
with respect to the eleventh ground thereof. 
19. The court erred in overruling the motion 
of this defendant for a new trial and particularly 
with respect to the twenty-sixth ground thereof. 
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20. The court erred in overruling the motion 
of this defendant for a new trial and particularly 
with respect to the twenty-seventh ground thereof. 
21. The court erred in overruling the motion 
of this defendant for a new trial and particularly 
with respect to the twenty-eighth ground thereof. 
22. The court erred in overruling the motion 
of this defendant for a new trial and particularly 
with respect to the twenty-ninth ground thereof. 
23. The court erred in overruling the motion 
of this defendant for a new trial and particularly 
with respect to the thirtieth ground thereof. 
24. The court erred in overruling the motion 
of this defendant for a new trial and particularly 
with respect to the thirty-first ground thereof. 
25. The court erred in overruling the motion 
of this defendant for a new trial and particularly 
with respect to the thirty-second ground thereof. 
26. The court erred in overruling the motion 
of this defendant for a new trial and particularly 
with respect to the thirty-third ground thereof. 
27. The court erred in overruling the motion 
of this defendant for a new trial and particularly 
with respect to the thirty-fourth ground thereof. 
28. The court erred in overruling the motion 
of this defendant for a new trial and particularly 
with respect to the thirty-fifth ground thereof. 
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29. The court erred in overruling the motion 
of this defendant for a new trial and particularly 
with respect to the thirty-sixth ground thereof. 
30. The court erred in overruling the motion 
of this defendant for a new trial and particularly 
with respect to the thirty-seventh ground thereof. 
31. The court erred in overruling the motion 
of this defendant for a new trial and particularly 
with respect to the thirty-eighth ground thereof. 
32. The court erred in overruling the motion 
of this defendant for a new trial and particularly 
with respect to the thirty-ninth ground thereof. 
33. The court erred in overruling the motion 
of this defendant for a new trial and particularly 
with respect to the fortieth ground thereof. 
34. The court erred in making and entering 
its findings of fact herein for the reason that 
and because the complaint herein does not stat(>. 
set forth or contain facts sufficient to constitute 
a cause of action against this defendant. 
35. The court erred in making and entering 
its conclusions of law herein for the reason that 
the complaint herein does not state, set forth or 
contain facts sufficient to constitute a cause of 
action against the defendant. 
36. The court erred in making and entering 
its findings of fact and conclusions of law herein 
for the reason that the complaint herein does 
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not state, set forth or contain facts sufficient to 
constitute a cause of action against this defend-
ant. 
37. The court erred in entering its decree 
herein because the complaint herein does not state, 
set forth or contain facts sufficient to constitute 
a cause of action against this defendant. 
38. The court erred in making and entering 
its findings of fact herein because the same arc 
not supported by the pleadings herein. 
39. The court erred in making and entering 
its conclusions of law herein because the same are 
not supported by the pleadings herein. 
40. The court erred in making and entering 
its decree herein because the same is not supported 
by the pleadings herein. 
41. The court erred m making and entering 
its decree herein for the reason that the same 
is not supported by the pleadings, findings of fact 
and conclusions of law as made by the court. 
WHEREFORE this defendant and appellant 
respectfully prays that because of the errors above 
specified and other errors manifest on the face 
of the record, the decree herein may be reversed, 
set aside and for naught held and the cause re-
manded to the court below for such further pro-
ceedings and with such further directions as to 
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this honorable court may seem meet and proper 
in the premises. 
DICKSON, ELLIS & LUCAS, 
L. F. ADAMSON, 
Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant, 
Utab. Copper Company. 
Service of the foregoing Assignments of Error 
admitted this 28th day of June, 1918. 
WILLARD HANSON, 
BOOTH, LEE, BADGER & RICH, 
Attorneys for Respondents. 
